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Abstract 
 
 
The Vietnam and Salvadoran wars were marked by examples of some of the worst 
atrocities committed during the course of twentieth century conflict. The massacres 
at My Lai in Vietnam and El Mozote in El Salvador came to be regarded by many as 
the defining actions of those wars. These tragedies, however, were not isolated 
examples, and civilians in each war often bore the brunt of military operations 
designed to defeat the leftist insurgencies that had erupted in these countries. This 
thesis will examine why soldiers committed such war crimes in Vietnam and El 
Salvador. 
 
Inextricably linked by the presence of the United States, the conflicts in Vietnam and 
El Salvador book-ended a period of intense division within American society, 
politics and the military. Intense debate over the direction of American foreign and 
military policy had resulted in shifting political tides over the decade between the 
two wars. This thesis will place the topic of war crimes within this context of a 
changing political scene in the United States. 
 
In doing so, this thesis will break from more narrowly defined investigations of 
atrocities in Vietnam and El Salvador. It will reject the more common analyses of 
these conflicts that too often see them in isolation. Instead, the continuation of 
policies from one to the other will highlight the fact that American foreign and 
military policy did not simply end with one war and start again with the next. 
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Introduction 
 
„Atrocity – this close range murder of the innocent and helpless – is the most 
repulsive aspect of war, and that which resides within man and permits him to 
perform these acts is the most repulsive aspect of mankind.‟1 - Lieutenant Colonel 
Dave Grossman 
 
 
On 16 March 1968, in one of the most notorious incidents of the Vietnam War, 
soldiers from the U.S. Army‟s Americal Division killed nearly five hundred 
Vietnamese civilians in the community of My Lai. It was a massacre that sent shock 
waves through American society when it became public knowledge in 1969, and led 
to serious questions about the state of the American military. The atrocity was an 
uncomfortable topic for the United States as a nation in subsequent years. It lingered 
in the American psyche for decades beyond the culmination of the war, though in 
what Kendrick Oliver has termed only a „fragile, intermittent, and partial‟ state in the 
public‟s memory.2 It was one aspect of the Vietnam syndrome, a condition which 
had created „public uncertainty about America‟s proper role in the world, partisan 
division over foreign policy, and institutional conflict between Congress and the 
executive branch.‟3 
 
                                                 
1
 Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society 
(Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1996), p. 227. 
2
 Kendrick Oliver, „Atrocity, Authenticity, and American Exceptionalism: (Ir)rationalising the 
Massacre at My Lai‟, Journal of American Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (August, 2003), p. 250. 
3
 William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992 
(North Carolina, University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p. 8. 
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The Vietnam syndrome had been coined as a term by Ronald Reagan during his 
speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in the build up to the 1980 
presidential election. The Republican candidate saw America as suffering from 
needless guilt over its intervention in Vietnam, and felt the country had become 
hesitant about standing up to aggression throughout the world.
4
 It was a direct 
riposte to President Carter‟s administration. Watergate, the misdeeds of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and fears over executive privilege had pushed Congress 
into seeking a more active role in determining U.S. foreign policy during the 1970s.
5
 
Carter, moderate and reformist, had epitomised this new Congressional approach. 
His foreign policy had emphasised compromise and co-operation.
6
 Reagan, however, 
demanded a new focus on military preparedness in order to deal with threats to 
American interests.
7
 
 
It was in the midst of this national division that the United States committed itself to 
aiding the staunchly anti-communist military government of El Salvador. The United 
States had provided some military support to El Salvador since World War II.
8
 
However, the burgeoning threat of the leftist insurgency in El Salvador during 
Carter‟s presidency had increased the importance of the Central American country in 
American foreign policy. As the fragile stability in the country faded away towards 
the end of the 1970s, El Salvador received unprecedented attention from an 
                                                 
4
 New York Times, 19 August 1980. 
5
 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, p. 8. 
6
 New York Times, 24 June 1976. 
7
 New York Times, 30 January 1980. 
8
 „Background Information on the Security Forces in El Salvador and U.S. Military Assistance‟, 
Report, 1 March 1980. 
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American administration that regarded the situation there as the most precarious in 
the region.
9
 The final breakdown in El Salvador‟s internal stability occurred amidst 
the campaign fervour of the 1980 U.S. presidential election, and the tiny, 
impoverished Central American country became symbolic of the two conflicting 
approaches to American foreign policy offered by Carter and Reagan. 
 
The outbreak of civil war in El Salvador, following the unification of various 
insurgent groups into the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and its 
subsequent offensive in January 1981, challenged the United States‟ Vietnam 
syndrome and foreign policy trajectory. Supporting one of the „military monsters‟,10 
as Walter LaFeber termed Central American countries during the 1980s, forced 
America to once again contemplate the possibility of its soldiers fighting a 
communist insurgency in a Third World nation. Arguments over the necessity of 
intervention in El Salvador and the willingness to support an authoritarian, morally 
dubious government created echoes of the turmoil Vietnam had produced in 
American society, and commentators reflected fears of a similar intervention in 
newspapers across the country.
11
 
 
The echo of Vietnam became more resonant when, on 10 December 1981, members 
of the Atlacatl Battalion of El Salvador‟s Armed Forces (ESAF) marched into El 
Mozote, a small community located in the mountains of Morazán, one of El 
Salvador‟s eastern departments. The following day, they executed seven hundred and 
                                                 
9
 Washington Post, 14 September 1979. 
10
 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York, W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1993), p. 363. 
11
 See for example: New York Times, 25 February 1982. 
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sixty seven men, women and children from the area. The massacre at El Mozote was 
an act of savage brutality, notable even in a civil war that is remembered for its 
severity and lack of humanity. Dismissed by the Reagan administration as leftist 
propaganda, the atrocity was only fully brought to light following Mark Danner‟s 
investigation into the incident, which culminated in his 1994 work, The Massacre at 
El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War. The spectre of My Lai had emerged in 
America‟s newest battle against communist guerrillas. 
 
The intention of this study is to explore how this spectre emerged. It will ask why 
soldiers committed atrocities in Vietnam, and why Salvadoran troops committed 
similar war crimes in their own fight against communist insurgents a decade later.  It 
was argued that El Salvador represented America‟s first counterinsurgency 
experience since Vietnam.
12
 Counterinsurgency demands an emphasis on securing 
the population‟s loyalty and safety, according to one of its leading theorists, David 
Galula.
13
 Such an objective was ignored by American forces in Vietnam, and then by 
ESAF during its own conflict against guerrillas. Instead, the American and 
Salvadoran forces engaged in conventional warfare, employing tactics and firepower 
on a scale more suited to any prospective battle against Soviet forces in Europe. This 
study will contend that this reliance on conventionality – tactics, strategy and 
doctrine – bore ultimate responsibility for the civilian lives lost in Vietnam and El 
Salvador.  
 
                                                 
12
 Daniel Siegel and Joy Hackel, „El Salvador: Counterinsurgency Revisited‟, in Michael T. Klare and 
Peter Kornbluh (eds.), Low-Intensity Conflict: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism 
in the Eighties (New York, Pantheon Books, 1998), p. 112. 
13
 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practise (Westport, Praeger, 2006), p. 4. 
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That civilian lives were lost in such brutal fashion in both wars, and that the U.S. 
was involved in both conflicts too, has led to accusations that American military 
policy directly increased human rights violations. Critics of U.S. policy during the 
1970s and 1980s have argued that the U.S. bought off Latin American militaries, 
transforming them into local power bases that secured the interests of the U.S in the 
region and facilitated the internationalisation of state-sponsored violence.
14
 This 
work will seek to offer some balance to this issue, proposing that, despite important 
American influence on ESAF, accusations of U.S. complicity in war crimes during 
El Salvador‟s civil war have often been exaggerated. It is certainly true that the U.S. 
provided Salvadoran forces with doctrine and firepower unsuitable for countering the 
communist insurgency. A failure to integrate counterinsurgency into its doctrine 
after Vietnam weakened the effectiveness of U.S. Army assistance to ESAF, leading 
to the creation and maintenance of an entirely conventional indigenous military in El 
Salvador.
15
 However, stringent criticism of the American role in El Salvador often 
fails to take into account the importance of internal factors: neglecting the social, 
economic and political realities of contemporary El Salvador and its often violent 
history closes off an important avenue of understanding in relation to the actions of 
its armed forces against civilians during the civil war. Underestimating just how 
fractured the American military and diplomatic program in El Salvador was 
compounds this lack of understanding. Disagreements between the departments of 
Defense and State, U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom) and the Military Group 
(MilGroup) in El Salvador itself meant that American influence was often ineffectual 
                                                 
14
 Lesley Gill, The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas 
(Durham, Duke University Press, 2004), p. 7. 
15
 Richard Duncan Downie, Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador and 
the Drug War (Westport, Praeger, 1998), p. 155. 
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and suffered from a lack of direction. Thus, this study will emphasise the balance 
that must be maintained in assessing American influence in El Salvador. 
 
Whether the result of American or Salvadoran factors, it was an application of 
conventional military doctrine that created soldiers capable of atrocity. Convention 
created a path to atrocity that the soldiers present at My Lai, El Mozote and other 
examples of war crimes in Vietnam and El Salvador journeyed along. This study will 
examine each stage of this path in order to highlight the various factors during a 
soldier‟s military career that would mould him into someone capable of killing 
civilians. Firstly, the nature of training will be examined, in order to assess the 
impact that a soldier‟s first contact with the military had on his future conduct. His 
instruction in the ways of the military will be considered: the tactics he was taught, 
the weapons he was trained in. Most importantly of all, the extent of human rights 
training will be examined in order to assess the level of significance that was 
attached to it by the U.S. Army and ESAF. Secondly, the conduct of operations will 
be discussed. The manner in which soldiers executed their missions in these conflicts 
will be examined in order to assess how their tactics affected civilians in those areas 
they operated in. The discussion will then move on to an analysis of the officer corps 
of the U.S. Army and its Salvadoran counterpart, and their role in the path to 
atrocity. The quality of commanding officers has a vital role to play in determining 
the actions of soldiers, and highlighting personal and institutional weaknesses in the 
leadership element will help to show how this contributed to the momentum towards 
atrocity. This thesis will conclude with an examination of the personal interaction 
between soldiers and civilians in Vietnam and El Salvador, asking why soldiers 
diminished the worth of civilian life to the point at which it became expendable. 
10 
 
 
In searching for the answer to this question, this thesis will fit into the larger picture 
of research into the conduct of war. The cornerstones of such analysis are the works 
of Richard Holmes and Joanna Bourke, who have devoted much time into the study 
of human behaviour in war.
16
 Dave Grossman, as a former member of the military, 
has provided a closer examination of atrocity that gets to the heart of how men can 
behave so terribly in war.
17
 Their studies of the human aspect of combat link in with 
the larger examinations of violence that political scientists like William Stanley 
offer.
18
 Marginalising the political factors that affect the path to atrocity weakens an 
understanding of war crimes, and as such, larger examinations of politics, 
particularly foreign policy, are crucial. William LeoGrande, Walter LaFeber and 
Cynthia Arnson have all written extensively on the evolution of American policy 
with regards to Central America.
19
 By placing this study‟s examination of a path to 
atrocity into this wider body of literature, it is hoped that a better understanding of 
the topic of war crimes in Vietnam and El Salvador will be achieved. 
 
Tracing this path will show that soldiers who killed civilians in Vietnam and El 
Salvador did so because of a multitude of inter-related factors. There is no simple or 
easy explanation for their actions. Attempting to locate their behaviour within neat 
categories, as espoused by Mark Osiel,
20
 is insufficient. Dismissing these men as 
                                                 
16
 See Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behaviour of Men in Battle (London, Cassell Military, 
2004) and Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing (London, Granta Books, 2000). 
17
 See Grossman, On Killing. 
18
 See William Stanley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War 
in El Salvador (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1996). 
19
 See LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, and Cynthia Arnson, 
Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976-1993 (Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1993). 
20
 Mark J. Osiel, „Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War‟, California 
Law Review, Vol. 86, No. 5 (October, 1998), p. 1029. 
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„evil‟ is simplistic. Instead, only a thorough investigation of their environment, and 
the placement of their actions within the larger context of their times, can offer a 
suitable attempt at seeking explanations for their shocking behaviour.  Grossman 
argued that „atrocity has always been part of war, and in order to understand war, we 
must understand atrocity.‟21 Reversing this, and understanding Vietnam and El 
Salvador first – their conduct, their context, and their protagonists – is the only way 
to understand the terrible atrocities that were perpetrated during these wars. 
Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore, who led American troops at the battle of Ia 
Drang in November 1965, argued that „none of us had joined the Army to hurt 
children and frighten peaceful farm families.‟22 It is the intention of this study to 
show why, unfortunately, some of Moore‟s colleagues in Vietnam, and counterparts 
in El Salvador, behaved in exactly this manner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Grossman, On Killing, p. 193. 
22
 Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once... And Young (London, 
Corgi Books, 2002), p. 403. 
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Chapter 1: Conventional Atrocity 
 
 
„The United States entered the Vietnam War with a doctrine well suited to fighting 
conventional war in Europe, but worse than useless for the counterinsurgency it was 
about to combat.‟23 – John A. Nagl. 
 
 
 
With the exception of the introduction of strategic bombing, the U.S. Army‟s 
philosophy towards conducting combat had changed little from the Civil War 
through to Vietnam.
24
 General William Westmoreland, Commander of U.S. Military 
Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) was particularly enamoured of the 
similarities between Vietnam and the Civil War.
25
 With the most senior military 
commander in Vietnam assessing the conflict in this manner, it is unsurprising that 
the Army continued with this default mode of combat.
26
 These historical traditions 
and values were reinforced by the Army‟s capabilities and organisational structure. 
Firepower and mobility were two of the Army‟s strongest assets, and allowed for the 
maximisation of enemy casualties whilst minimising American combat injuries and 
deaths. These fed what Krepinevich termed „counterinsurgency American-style‟, and 
in Vietnam it became the modus operandi of the Army.
27
 It relegated pacification to 
a secondary concern behind the concept of attrition, pressuring troops to focus on 
                                                 
23
 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 115. 
24
 Nagl, Learning to Eat, p. 45. 
25
 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986), p. 167. 
26
 Nagl, Learning to Eat, p. 45. 
27
 Krepinevich, Army, p. 214. 
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body counts. Robert Thompson, an experienced British counterinsurgency expert 
who had served in Malaya, regarded this strategy as a product of specifically 
American military traits: impatience, impulsiveness, aggression, and materialism. He 
noted that conventional, attrition-based warfare had a specific appeal to the Army 
because it played into these notions.
28
  Given that firepower and brashness were 
decisive features of the Army in Vietnam,
29
 Thompson‟s assessment was not without 
merit. 
 
An emphasis on attrition created pressure on soldiers that minimised their concern 
for civilians. Philip Caputo remarked that by 1967, U.S. Army forces in Vietnam 
were „going to kill people for a few cans of beer and the time to drink it.‟30 For the 
members of Tiger Force, who killed a number of civilians during the course of their 
operations, the body count was the primary determinant of success, not the security 
of a village, nor even the conventional „taking‟ of the target.31 Those at My Lai were 
responding to the exhortations of their commanding officer to conduct more 
aggressive combat operations in order to show a quantifiable measure of success for 
their time in the province of Quang Ngai.
32
 Similarly, Neil Sheehan recalled an 
exchange with Westmoreland during which, upon being quizzed about the levels of 
civilians being killed in artillery bombardments, the general replied: „yes Neil, it is a 
                                                 
28
 Robert Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam (London, Chatto & Windus, 1969), p. 125. 
29
 „Interview with Bill Paris‟, 27 May 2003, Bill Paris Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech 
University, (15/4/2010). 
30
 Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (New York, Ballantine Books, 1977), p. 294. 
31
 Toledo Blade, 19 October 2003. 
32
 Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim, Four Hours in My Lai (New York, Viking, 1992), p. 94. 
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problem, but it does deprive the enemy of the population, doesn‟t it?‟33 As well as 
being a gross misunderstanding of the nature of the war, this attitude to the conduct 
of the conflict would filter down to subordinate commands. 
 
Westmoreland was instrumental in determining the course of the American military 
strategy in Vietnam, and he was responsible for downgrading the counterinsurgency 
element of the conflict in favour of maximising the effort U.S. forces went to in 
seeking the destruction of enemy forces. This was particularly noticeable in his 
rejection of the Marine Corps‟ Combined Action Platoons (CAP). Despite being 
deployed in I Corps - the area of South Vietnam where a conventional NVA invasion 
would most likely occur - the Marines had opted for an unconventional strategy that 
aimed to ensure the population‟s safety. The Marines inserted rifle squads into 
individual villages, and each small group of soldiers would live in a specific 
community for extended periods of time. Regular Marine battalions would then 
alternate between the more conventional patrolling strategy and civic programs. 
 
The CAP program was hailed as a success by many observers, who noted the 
positive affect it had on morale for the Marines and the improved safety of 
Vietnamese villages.
34
 Westmoreland, though agreeable to the principle of the 
program, rejected an expansion of the CAP strategy and terminated any attempt to 
place greater emphasis on it.
35
 In rebuffing the Marines‟ counterinsurgency program 
Westmoreland secured the continuation of the Army‟s conventional doctrine. He 
                                                 
33
 Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie (London, Picador, 1990), p. 621. 
34
 See Thompson, No Exit, p. 138 and Krepinevich, Army, p. 174. 
35
 Nagl, Learning to Eat, p. 158. 
15 
 
also downplayed the March 1966 Program for the Pacification and Long Term 
Development of South Vietnam report. This analysis of the American effort in 
Vietnam, overseen by Westmoreland‟s successor as COMUSMACV, General 
Creighton Abrams, rejected the entirety of the American strategy in Vietnam up to 
that point.
36
 Westmoreland‟s conscious decision to ignore its recommendations that 
the U.S. adopt a counterinsurgency policy and terminate its current strategy of 
convention was symptomatic of the grip that regular warfare had on the 
philosophical mindset of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. Westmoreland was replaced as 
COMUSMACV in June 1968, but Abrams could not secure victory either. The U.S. 
withdrew from South Vietnam in 1975 amidst chaotic scenes on the roof of the 
American embassy as people frantically attempted to clamber aboard the final 
departing U.S. helicopters.
37
 
 
The prevailing point of view within the Army in the aftermath of Vietnam was one 
of utter bewilderment that the world‟s best equipped, most expensively assembled 
fighting force had to withdraw from a war against a native insurgency. The war in 
Vietnam had followed great success in Europe during two world wars, and to a lesser 
extent, military achievements in Korea. For many in the U.S. Army, and indeed 
across America as a nation, the solution was to turn inwards, to repress the wounds 
of the immediate past and to focus on the future. 
 
The future for the U.S. Army was a return to conventional war, though „return‟ is 
perhaps a slightly ironic term for what in reality was a re-doubling of the emphasis 
                                                 
36
 Ibid, p. 159. 
37
 Chicago Tribune, April 30 1975. 
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on conventional warfare as the Army‟s modus operandi. Labouring under the 
misconception that its forces had engaged in too little conventional fighting during 
Vietnam, the post-war Army set about educating its troops in the conduct of 
operations that were more to the Army‟s liking. By the end of the decade, the 
Command and General Staff College had cut the „Low Intensity Conflict‟ (LIC) 
course on its syllabus from forty hours to a mere nine.
38
 Under the leadership of 
General William DePuy, who had been Westmoreland‟s operations officer during 
Vietnam, and had commanded the 1
st
 Infantry Division, Army manuals purged the 
very mention of counterinsurgency: the tenets of Army operations for the post-
Vietnam era were set out in Field Manual 100-5 Operations, published in 1976, and 
the instructions within the document failed to mention counterinsurgency at all.
39
 
Instead, the manual marked the pinnacle of attrition and convention as the 
cornerstones of Army doctrine.
40
 
 
Richard Duncan Downie, in his thorough and scientific study of the U.S. Army in 
Vietnam, El Salvador and the drug wars in the Andean mountain range, has termed 
this period in the 1970s as the Army‟s „avoidance phase‟.41 It is not a surprising 
analysis, when one considers the neglect of counterinsurgency during this period 
combined with the advocacy of renewed focus on conventional warfare employed as 
a defence against Soviet offensives in Europe. Damaged by the disastrous outcome 
of Vietnam, with accusations of incompetent leadership, war crimes and cover-ups, 
                                                 
38
 Nagl, Learning to Eat, p. 206. 
39
 Ibid, p. 206. 
40
 Dennis Stewart Driggers, „The United States Army‟s Long March from Saigon to Baghdad: The 
Development of War-Fighting Doctrine in the Post-Vietnam Era‟ (Unpublished PhD thesis, Syracuse 
University, 1995), p. 50. 
41
 Downie, Learning from Conflict, p. 68. 
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plus a series of scandals involving Post Exchanges and academy exam papers, the 
Army suffered crises of confidence, adaptation and conscience.
42
 
 
Its solution was to ignore Vietnam, and to refocus on what it regarded as its role in 
the Cold War – a conventional force designed to maintain the peace in Europe and 
prevent a Soviet offensive through the Fulda Gap.
43
 Influential senior officers 
spurred this effort, with Army Generals William E. DePuy and Donn A. Starry 
providing much of the impetus through their role as the first two commanders of the 
U.S. Army‟s new Training and Doctrine Command. They were aided in their efforts 
by a variety of dynamics that provided justification and a rationale for the Army‟s 
conventional outlook. The Yom Kippur War in October 1973 provided a convenient 
excuse for the Army‟s post-Vietnam philosophy, with its infantry-backed armour 
combat being hailed as the model of future warfare by DePuy; he would utilise the 
Yom Kippur War in his persuasion of other Army officers that the tank was the 
Army‟s new primary method of offense.44 
 
DePuy, who was a firm advocate of the Army‟s approach to Vietnam – he had 
persuaded Westmoreland that the Marine‟s CAP program was ineffective and should 
be terminated – was one of a number of senior Army officers who were involved in 
the formulation of doctrine during the 1970s.
45
 These officers implemented a 
                                                 
42
 Richard Gabriel, To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier 
(Westport, Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 4. 
43
 Saul Bronfeld, „Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army‟, 
The Journal of Military History, Vol. 71, No. 2 (April, 2007), p. 496. 
44
 Ibid, p. 475. 
45
 Conrad C. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: the U.S. Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia 
(Carlisle, Combat Studies Institute, 2002), p. 4. 
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deliberate, and counter-productive „No More Vietnams‟ approach, shifting attention 
away from counterinsurgency and disassembling the Army‟s ability to engage in 
Third World conflict.
46
 It is little wonder that, assessing the Salvadoran civil war in 
1986, Colonel John D. Waghelstein bemoaned a complete lack of training in 
counterinsurgency for American soldiers, and only a marginal level of training for 
officers, in the years prior to the advisory effort there.
47
  
 
This conventional philosophy was unsurprising, given that when the U.S. Army 
reluctantly examined its performance in Vietnam, it took to heart the assessment of 
one particular officer, Colonel Harry Summers. Summers‟ 1982 work, On Strategy: 
A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, was regarded as the logical explanation for 
the Army‟s failings in Vietnam, and was considered by many in the upper echelons 
of the Army during the 1970s and early 1980s to be the only assessment of Vietnam 
that merited serious consideration.
48
 Within its pages, On Strategy paints a picture of 
an American military force that performed superbly in Vietnam: one that was 
„unbeatable‟ on the battlefield.49 In addition to affirming the U.S. military‟s prowess, 
Summers assuaged the doubts of the 1970s. Rejecting the argument that Vietnam 
was a revolutionary conflict, he emphasised the point that counterinsurgency was 
misguided and that when the U.S. had defeated guerrilla forces during the war, it had 
been through conventional arms and strategies.
50
 
                                                 
46
 Downie, Learning From Conflict, p. 70. 
47
 Interview with Colonel John D. Waghelstein in Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk (eds.), El 
Salvador at War (Washington, DC., National Defense University Press, 1988), p. 404. 
48
 Nagl, Learning to Eat, p. 206. 
49
 Col. Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, Presidio 
Press, 1982), p. 1. 
50
 Summers, On Strategy, p. 90. 
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The Army‟s conscious decision to marginalise counterinsurgency, even to excise the 
term from its lexicon, in the aftermath of Vietnam resulted in an ever greater 
misunderstanding of the principles and techniques of genuine counterinsurgency in 
the years immediately preceding the Salvadoran civil war. And just as 
conventionality produced atrocity in Vietnam, so too would an emphasis on 
conventional arms and tactics in El Salvador produce an environment in which the 
safety of civilians was not adequately ensured. 
 
In November 1981, after a request by Salvadoran President José Napoleón Duarte 
for senior American military involvement, U.S. Army General Fred Woerner 
submitted a report to the United States and Salvadoran governments entitled the 
Report of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team.
51
 Alongside seven 
other members of the team, and after eight weeks of analysis and cooperation with 
Salvadoran officers, Woerner presented his findings in a document that was the most 
thorough, detailed examination of the Salvadoran military ever conducted.
52
 The 
Woerner Report highlighted rampant deficiencies in ESAF and recommended that 
U.S. assistance be devoted to creating a national strategy for „Strategic Victory‟ - to 
„destroy the insurgent will and capability to fight; and defend the national territory 
from internal and external aggression.‟53 As the American government‟s first real 
examination of its ally, Woerner examined a litany of complaints concerning the 
Salvadoran approach to the civil war that had erupted the previous year, including 
                                                 
51
 Interview with José Napoleón Duarte, El Salvador at War, p. 112. 
52
 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, p. 137. 
53
 Report of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assessment Team (Woerner Report), p. 185. 
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many of the failures which had led to the events at El Mozote, at the Sumpul and 
Lempa Rivers, and at numerous other instances of murder and massacre. However, 
rather than turning toward counterinsurgency analyses, Woerner commended the 
traditionalist ideas of Karl von Clausewitz and Summers‟ On Strategy as foundations 
for his „new‟ approach.54 His admiration for the two reflected the conventional 
approach to warfare which had dominated the Army‟s philosophy in Vietnam, 
lingered in its aftermath, and continued during El Salvador.  
 
Though observers in the press, academia and the military routinely described El 
Salvador as a counterinsurgency effort, and made direct comparisons with 
Vietnam,
55
 in reality the doctrine applied by the U.S. was based around Woerner‟s 
appreciation of convention. Though counterinsurgency had gained more adherents 
and a new name - Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) - during the Reagan administration, 
it was not accepted within the U.S. Army as a primary method of waging war. 
Woerner, like many within the military, believed convention, rather than 
counterinsurgency, would win the day in El Salvador. 
 
The traditions of El Salvador‟s military compounded the problem of an excessive 
focus on conventionality. For much of the twentieth century, ESAF had countered 
opposition through a brutal, indiscriminate policy of repression that was designed to 
destroy opposition, rather than incorporate reforms into the Salvadoran system.
56
 In 
particular the 1932 Matanza, in which the military government of General 
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Maximiliano Hernández Martínez killed around ten thousand campesino and Indian 
civilians out of retribution for their failed uprising, was taken as a marker for how to 
successfully deal with an insurgency.
57
 
 
Once the rebellion had petered out, the armed forces moved into those areas affected 
by trouble and proceeded to conduct large scale massacres as a means of cleansing 
infected areas: the military cordoned off any chance of escape for villagers before 
opening fire on civilians caught in the middle. According to Gregrio Bustamente 
Maceo‟s account of the military‟s actions in the town of Juayúa, 
 
„they ordered all of the honourable men who were not communists to present 
themselves at the Municipal building, to give them safe conduct, and when the 
plaza was replete with men, women and children they blocked the streets 
leading out of the plaza and machine gunned the innocent multitude, not even 
the poor dogs who always faithfully follow their Indian masters escaped.‟58 
 
This approach was reminiscent of that used at El Mozote. After being assured of 
their safety by the military, the inhabitants of El Mozote and the surrounding area 
congregated in the village as a means of securing themselves from the sweep taking 
place through Morazán by the Atlacatl Battalion.
59
 Upon entering the area, the 
Atlacatl sealed off the community and proceeded to massacre those trapped within. 
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The parallels lend credence to Lauria-Santiago‟s argument that the Matanza was part 
of the ideology of the repressive agencies during the civil war later in the century.
60
  
 
With the Matanza offering guidance for combat commanders in the civil war, El 
Salvador‟s actions in the 1969 Soccer War with Honduras also helped decide the 
trajectory of strategy in the subsequent civil conflict.
61
 Though ESAF was not 
countering guerrillas during the Soccer War, it was the most recent large-scale 
combat effort they had been involved in, and as such had a large impact on the 
combat experience of unit commanders. This reinforced the conventional military 
philosophy within ESAF.
62
 Its units had been trained and equipped for a 
conventional war with Honduras, and had ignored the doctrine of 
counterinsurgency.
63
 U.S. advisors found it difficult to counter the ethos of 
deploying extreme violence as a means to an end. Some officials recognised these 
processes, with Colonel Waghelstein particularly astute in assessing the damaging 
impact the Matanza and its aftermath had on Salvadoran society.
64
 However, such 
analysis failed to have any significant impact in deterring ESAF from its strategies. 
 
ESAF was also conscious of a perceived threat from Nicaragua, which had recently 
undergone tremendous political upheaval with the triumph of the leftist Sandinista 
regime. There was a very real fear within the military, particularly the officer corps, 
that the nation was facing a desperate situation, and if the guerrillas and leftists 
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succeeded – just as they had done in Nicaragua – then the military as an institution 
would fail.
65
 Ensuring the survival of the military became a priority.
66
 Consequently, 
the military tended to approve of any measures which would damage the chances of 
the left-wing gaining strength, whether militarily or in terms of popular support. 
After the eruption of violence following the nationwide uprising by the FMLN 
during its final offensive, ESAF‟s fears became more acute. Their response was to 
begin arresting, or simply killing, anyone with a genuine, perceived, or invented 
connection to leftist forces.
67
 Without the necessary commitment to reform or 
civilian security, this was not a counterinsurgency policy, but simply brutal, 
conventional repression. 
 
Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl argued that conventional armies are not effective 
forces for countering insurgencies, given their emphasis on offensive action in place 
of co-ordinated political, economic and social programs.
68
 As we have seen in this 
chapter, this was clearly evident in Vietnam and El Salvador. The U.S. Army 
relegated the importance of pacification for a great deal of the war in Vietnam, 
instead devoting itself to convention.
69
 Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, 
despite a number of high profile studies into the failures of Vietnam, conventional 
military doctrine remained the favoured approach for the U.S. Army.
70
 Thus, the 
Army‟s preferred solution to the Salvadoran insurgency was to focus on a 
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philosophy which differed little from the disastrous strategy of Vietnam. El 
Salvador‟s military had a predilection for convention that pre-dated American 
assistance, and this was reinforced by the surge of U.S. aid in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Soldiers in both forces were inadequately prepared for engaging in 
counterinsurgency environments, and civilians were to pay the price for this. 
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Chapter 2: Training to Murder 
 
 
„To understand what happens to the GI among the mine fields of My Lai, you must 
know something about what happens in America. You must understand Fort Lewis, 
Washington. You must understand a thing called basic training.‟71 – Tim O‟Brien. 
 
 
Understanding the atrocities of Vietnam and El Salvador does not begin in My Lai or 
El Mozote. Those soldiers who committed murder and massacre in these wars took a 
long path to their brutality. It was a journey that began upon their entry into the 
military, and continued through their initial stage of military life: training. Richard 
Holmes has commented on the disproportionate impact of training upon men in the 
armed forces. He argued that, given training is a recruit‟s initial contact with the 
military‟s way of life, with all of its policies, rituals and idiosyncrasies, the relative 
level of influence on the recruit is much greater than at the further stages of his 
military career.
72
 Grossman, himself a former member of the United States military, 
asked, 
 
„Lives there a veteran who cannot close his eyes and vividly visualize his drill 
sergeant? Over the years a hundred bosses, teachers, professors, instructors, 
sergeants, and officers have directed various aspects of my life, but none has 
had the impact that Drill Sergeant G. had on that cold morning in 1974.‟73 
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Thus, training is a crucial factor to examine when asking questions about the 
behaviour of soldiers in Vietnam and El Salvador. Strangely, as Holmes has also 
noted, the study of training is often overshadowed by the history of great battles, 
tactics and strategy. He points out that in neglecting the soldier‟s life before he even 
sets foot upon a battlefield, fundamental information is missed which can cast 
illumination on why a man acts as he does under the stresses and strains of the 
horrors of war.
74
 Seeking answers on the nature of training for the soldiers of 
Vietnam and El Salvador can help to more accurately understand how some would 
later turn their weapons on innocent civilians. 
 
History teaches us many lessons about the capacity of ordinary men and women to 
inflict humiliating defeats upon professional armed forces, but there is no denying 
that the most successful armies sustained their victories on the back of rigorous, 
effective training programs. At the core is the simple notion that training‟s purpose is 
to transform a member of civilian society into a soldier – a functioning, effective 
member of the military.
75
 However, many commentators sharply rebuked the 
perpetrators of My Lai for failing to discharge their duty properly, and denounced Lt. 
William Calley, who commanded Charlie Company that day, as failing to do his job 
as a soldier and a leader.
76
 In El Salvador, some members its armed forces belatedly 
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admitted responsibility for ineffectively protecting the population.
77
 This chapter will 
therefore seek to understand what impact training had upon soldiers in these wars. 
The training of soldiers for Vietnam will be analysed, before a discussion of the U.S. 
role in training ESAF. The chapter will conclude by examining ESAF‟s own training 
policies. In doing so, this section will ask if a soldier‟s training created failures in 
ethics, or whether troops carried out operations in accordance with their training. 
 
American military training during the Vietnam War could be staggering in its 
application of violence towards recruits. One recruit, as told in Mark Baker‟s 
excellent collection of first-hand, though anonymous, accounts from Vietnam, 
recalled that, 
 
„It was really funny, a take-off from Gomer Pyle. The guy within arm‟s reach of 
the Marine was laughing just like everybody else. Smokey Bear whipped 
around and smacked him right in the face, knocked him halfway through the 
window. His head bounced off the luggage rack and he reeled back out in the 
aisle.‟78 
 
Anonymity does not lend itself to corroboration. However, when examining other 
accounts of Marine Corps training, one finds similar examples that demonstrate the 
brutality of that particular service‟s training regime. Scott Dawson, a member of the 
Marines during Vietnam, stated that his Drill Instructor struck him in the solar 
plexus, along with several of his comrades, in retribution for not having had to do 
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this previously during training.
79
 Thus, violence was not only applied as punishment 
for infractions, but was also applied in examples of spotless behaviour: aggression 
was omnipresent.  
 
The U.S. Army training regime does not seem to have exhibited this brutality to the 
same extent as the Marine Corps. There does not appear to have been the same 
extremism as was displayed at Parris Island, the Marine Corps‟ infamous training 
facility in South Carolina. Accounts of violence inflicted upon Army recruits are not 
to be found in the documentary evidence, or in the numerous oral histories that were 
examined for this study. This is not to say that such incidents did not occur, but the 
lack of such evidence suggests that the U.S. Army may have demonstrated more 
restraint towards its men. 
 
However, the Army did display a more insidious, and more dangerous, approach to 
sanctioning violence. As one soldier put it, „the people in the Army were not 
intellectuals‟,80 and the approach in training was to subject recruits to the mantra that 
the toughest, largest and most dominating element was superior. Those who could 
enforce discipline through sheer physical presence, as well as the ability to translate 
such presence into force when required, were placed in charge of units from an early 
stage.
81
 It meant that from their initial stages in the Army, soldiers were learning that 
force was the primary means of dealing with any situation. In the complex world of 
the Vietnamese countryside, where completing a successful counterinsurgency 
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mission was based upon effectively navigating shifting loyalties, complicated local 
history and dynamic local relations, this approach was unworkable – it lent itself to 
blasting past any issue with as much force as possible. 
 
This ethos was reinforced by the Army‟s massive array of conventional weapons 
systems. Training was designed to facilitate the effective deployment of traditional 
weaponry, often in excessive quantities. The vast majority of training was devoted to 
teaching soldiers how to kill the enemy using every weapon at the disposal of the 
Army. The most basic level of weapons training was hand-to-hand combat, and 
bayonet training was particularly intense. Tim O‟Brien recalled that „again and again 
we thrust into mid-air imagined bellies, sometimes towards throats‟, whilst all the 
time bellowing that „Drill Sergeant, the spirit of the bayonet is to kill! To kill!‟82 
Timothy Vail remembered that „we had bayonet training, big on bayonet training.‟83 
Given the time spent on this weapon in training, the heightened sense of aggression 
it facilitated was incredibly powerful. 
 
The bayonet may have offered some advantages in the confined, nervy and often 
close-quarters combat of the Vietnamese jungles. However, it does not seem that the 
Army utilised this weapon after training, with Vail adding that he never had a 
bayonet in Vietnam.
84
 No other testimony studied mentions the bayonet in combat in 
Vietnam either. Its primary importance for the Army was in creating a hyper-
aggressive state of mind in troops. It did this much more effectively than rifle 
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marksmanship and mortar training, because those kinds of weapons reflected a mid-
level range of engagement, replete with ducking, covering and cowering, whereas 
bayonets required aggression and face-to-face interaction with the enemy.
85
 In 
teaching this skill relentlessly to new recruits, the Army fostered a much more 
aggressive attitude in its troops. It sent them to Vietnam with a heightened capacity 
for close-quarters bloodshed, and taught them that such aggression was not only 
acceptable, it was required and demanded. 
 
The rifle, of course, occupied a great deal of a recruit‟s time. The M-16 was the 
standard weapon for Army troops in Vietnam, and though soldiers would be 
expected to learn how to handle other weapons, the M-16 was the first weapon 
encountered, and the weapon most used in combat. Training to use a rifle involved 
the standard process of range firing, devised to teach accuracy and general rifle 
marksmanship. However, the Army also employed teaching aids that promoted a 
careless and indiscriminate use of the rifle, albeit with the tactical justification of 
better combat effectiveness. One such teaching aid was known as the „Quick-Kill 
Program‟, and was taught using small metal discs that were suddenly thrown out into 
the air, requiring the recruit to score a hit with their weapon. Another was the use of 
pop-up targets, which required split-second firing reaction. The Army felt that in a 
combat environment in which an enemy could appear for as little as two seconds at a 
time, more dependable accuracy was required from its troops.
86
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Some soldiers approved of this element of the training. Gary Franklin, a member of 
the Americal Division and deployed to Vietnam in June 1968, recalled that at Fort 
Polk, where he underwent Advanced Infantry Training, the Army‟s rapid fire 
training course „was a big help.‟87 However, an unfortunate consequence was that 
soldiers were being taught to fire off a round at a momentary glimpse of a possible 
target, without carefully deciding upon its nature. With their decision-making 
processes manipulated by training, it was unsurprising that out in Vietnam, in the 
jungles and hamlets, in the rice paddies and deltas, careful acquisition and 
engagement of targets was lacking. Soldiers were being taught to fire first, and ask 
questions later.  
 
Such questions should have been based around the pertinent questions of who 
constituted legitimate targets in a war like Vietnam, and how was the huge quantity 
of conventional firepower available to U.S. Army soldiers to be effectively and 
discriminately employed against the NVA and VC. These topics came under the 
subject of human rights training, and could have offered an effective counterbalance 
to the emphasis on force maintained elsewhere throughout training. In the twentieth-
century, following the adoption of legally binding international legislation, 
particularly the Hague and Geneva Conventions, human rights training became more 
relevant to militaries that now had to enforce the regulations upon their soldiers. Did 
the U.S. Army offer its soldiers sufficient training in these policies? 
 
The U.S Army operated with the obligation to uphold two aspects of the law of war. 
The first of these was the written law of war. As a signatory nation of the Geneva 
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Conventions,
88
 the United States was bound by law to operate within the constraints 
of these legally defined and specifically worded human rights initiatives. The second 
form of military law was known as the unwritten, or customary, law of war. This 
concept of combat legislation was not explicitly documented. However the Peers 
Report, General William Peers‟ final report on the investigation into the My Lai 
massacre and its subsequent cover-up, noted that the customary law of war was, at 
the time of Vietnam, „well defined by recognised authorities on international law and 
is firmly established by the custom and usage of civilised nations.‟89  
 
The U.S. Army understood that the Vietnam War was a conflict in which both forms 
of the law of war were to be adhered to.
90
 The documentary evidence points to the 
fact that the upper echelons of the Army during the Vietnam War were committed to 
complying with international human rights treaties. The sheer number and scope of 
Army regulations that a soldier was required to comply with was testament to this. 
The U.S. Army‟s Field Manual (FM) 27-10 „The Law of Land Warfare‟ contained 
the fundamental regulations concerning the behaviour of soldiers on the battlefield.
91
  
 
The Army directed that training was to be conducted at a level such that „the 
individual soldier understands his specific duties and obligations in the pursuit of the 
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US national policy.‟92 Drill instructors were obligated under Army Regulation (AR) 
350-216 to provide training that was „adequate to insure that all members of their 
commands understand the principles and provisions of the Geneva Conventions.‟93 
There was clearly a legal obligation to make an effort to teach soldiers about human 
rights.  
 
However, a legal obligation, and the authority of an order from the upper echelons of 
the chain of command, did not necessarily mean training was particularly effective 
or prolonged in the matter of human rights. During the initial stages of a soldier‟s 
military service, the Army allocated only one hour to the study of human rights and 
conduct in the field with regards to the law of war. This one hour of training was 
based upon Army Subject Schedule 21-18, and as such was to be uniformly applied 
across all units, at all training installations. It was to be conducted by a trained legal 
officer, and a note of completion was required on a serviceman‟s personnel record.94 
Despite good intentions, a single hour out of a three hundred and fifty two hour basic 
training program was simply insufficient for the purposes of understanding the 
Geneva Conventions. The one hour of training was overwhelmed by the devotion to 
tradition and convention within the Army; the basic training program allocated 
eighty three hours for rifle marksmanship, with drill and ceremony instruction 
allocated forty hours.
95
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Furthermore, the attitude towards Geneva Conventions training was liable to be 
tainted by the Army‟s inclination towards seeking the destruction of enemy forces, 
rather than safeguarding the civilian population. Grossman recounted that, 
 
„At Fort Benning I too had heard the “Geneva Convention and white 
phosphorous on equipment line” during the artillery pitch in Office Candidate 
School, the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Ranger school, and the Infantry 
Mortar Platoon Officer‟s Course. The treatment of POW‟s had been addressed 
by an instructor at Ranger school, and he clearly communicated his personal 
belief that in a raid or ambush, a patrol could not be expected to take POW‟s. I 
had noted that most of the outstanding young soldiers coming to us from the 
Ranger Battalion shared this Ranger school belief.‟96 
 
The „Geneva Convention and white phosphorous line‟ refers to comments made by 
soldiers, in Grossman‟s presence, advocating the firing of the lethal explosive 
chemical at an enemy‟s equipment rather than the enemy himself – the rationale 
being that deploying white phosphorous against a human being was a breach of the 
Geneva Conventions, whilst launching weapons at inanimate objects was not. Whilst 
Grossman has a courageous and admirable intolerance for this kind of thinking in the 
military – a standpoint that comes across strongly in his work – it is clear that some 
elements of the U.S. Army‟s instructor corps were willing to diminish the rules of 
land warfare in the presence of recruits. Indeed, the soldiers who carried out the My 
Lai massacre recalled a half-hearted approach in their human rights training, with 
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Herbert L. Carter later stating that instructors laughed at the prospect of fighting a 
humane, ethical war.
97
  
 
It may have been that the Army resented having external ethics imposed upon it; that 
for men who are accustomed to a way of doing things, as defined by many decades 
of tradition and experience, it was hard to stomach having to satisfy the politically-
correct decrees of politicians who had to maintain diplomatic relations with other 
nations, and for whom ignoring international law would present difficult and 
embarrassing situations. Indeed, the superintendent of West Point – the United States 
Military Academy – declared in 1979, even after the horrors and brutality of 
Vietnam had come to light, that 
 
„Military service does require a certain basic pattern of commitment in ethical 
beliefs. But... it is not possible to prescribe in advance and in detail for every 
situation. And unthinking acceptance of a set of ethics prefabricated by others 
seems to us to have little promise for American military officers.‟98 
 
It is highly ironic that the commanding officer of West Point viewed automatic 
acceptance of ideas with some suspicion, when the Army‟s entire ethos during 
training for Vietnam was one of instilling soldiers with the belief that orders were to 
be executed without question, discussion or compromise. It is of course entirely right 
that the Army train men to act decisively: after all, no army would be successful if 
troops procrastinated upon being given commands. However, what is relevant to war 
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crimes in Vietnam is that in a number of cases, soldiers who took part recalled that 
upon being given an order – irrespective of what that order constituted, or who gave 
it – they felt obliged to carry it out. Calley, testifying at his defence, remarked that 
„all orders were to be assumed legal, that the soldier's job was to carry out any order 
given him to the best of his ability.‟99 
 
Why did they feel this way? It has already been noted that there was no alternative 
notion of acceptable behaviour within the Army, which rigorously drilled this ethos 
into soldiers during training. Human rights training was basic and perfunctory, and 
lost within endless hours of aggressive training. Given this, a definite set of Army 
ethics – a well defined, oral and written code of conduct perhaps – may well have 
proved to be an effective barrier against the forces of atrocity in the field, when the 
pressure to kill was overwhelming, particularly if given an order by a superior 
officer. Richard Gabriel has written extensively on this issue, and his To Serve with 
Honor is a lucid, thought-provoking appeal for the U.S. Army to adopt a set of ethics 
that will provide its soldiers with the necessary framework upon which they can base 
decisions in the field. During Vietnam and over the following decade, the Army had 
no formal, specific set of ethics. Soldiers took the oath of commission, repeated the 
mantra of „Duty, Honour, and Country‟, and learnt of the Code of Conduct -  a code 
which only emphasised that soldiers, if captured and held as prisoners of war, were 
to act in a manner befitting the Army. In Gabriel‟s opinion, „all three are inadequate 
to the task of inculcating and reinforcing a special sense of ethical responsibility 
required of the soldier.‟100 Gabriel goes on to argue that „without a code of ethics we 
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may still fight, but we will fight as hollow men uncertain of our country, uncertain of 
our profession, but, most of all, uncertain of ourselves and our humanity in a world 
already grown too inhuman.‟101 The training of American soldiers for Vietnam 
offered little assistance in fighting this uncertainty. 
 
The second reason as to why soldiers in Vietnam found it impossible to deny the 
authority of an order to kill, regardless of the target, was that their training was 
devised in such a way as to make automatic acceptance of a command the norm. As 
previously noted, decisive action can be helpful in a combat zone. Yet this 
cornerstone of Army life was also a contributing factor to the propensity for 
massacre. Unwitting obedience is necessary for war crimes, but it works in 
conjunction with other powerful agencies that diminish a soldier‟s resistance to 
atrocity, as will be discussed throughout this study. The training of soldiers for 
Vietnam was particularly rigorous with regards to enforcing obedience. Philip 
Caputo recalled how training emphasised, indeed mandated, that orders were to be 
executed „instantly and in unison, without thinking.‟102    
 
The final reason, and one which created pressure on soldiers to commit to orders 
immediately and without question, was that the very concept of illegal orders was at 
best vaguely defined by the Army. In fact, the Peers Report was keen to stress that 
the very term „Illegal Order‟ was not to be found anywhere in the dictionary of Army 
phrases and terms, nor was it discussed at any great length in Army regulations, with 
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almost impossibly complex legalistic jargon employed when it is mentioned at all.
103
 
Given this, is it any wonder that the soldiers at My Lai offered no resistance to 
orders? In their eyes, any attempt to defy tactical commands during the operation 
would have resulted in disciplinary action, and their training prior to deployment was 
the origin of this thought process. As noted previously, Lt. Calley later testified that 
there was no concept of disobeying an order in the Army.
104
 Whilst this perspective 
could justifiably be seen as an attempt by Calley to clutch at straws in his attempt to 
avoid prosecution for the massacre, it is unwise to simply dismiss it as a flailing 
attempt at acquittal. It corroborates the evidence provided by other servicemen, like 
Caputo, as well as the formal, researched analysis of the Peers Report. Crucially, it 
highlights the very real effect of training deficiencies out in the field in Vietnam, and 
the tragic consequences they could produce. 
 
A decade after the horrors of Vietnam, the United States was engaged in training 
those who were fighting against an entrenched communist insurgency in an 
impoverished nation. The U.S. Army took on a leading role in instructing ESAF in 
how to carry out a war against a guerrilla force.
105
 Just as in Vietnam, accusations of 
human rights violations were levelled at the U.S., with a number of academics, 
politicians and commentators arguing that U.S. Army personnel and institutions 
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were instrumental in forging an indigenous military force that routinely directed 
violence against civilians.
106
 
 
Examining the training program for ESAF is a labyrinthine exercise. The duality of 
the assistance effort, with the United States providing training to Salvadoran troops 
alongside ESAF‟s own policies in combat instruction, means that it is a difficult 
proposition to judge the relative levels of influence of each approach. What is clear 
though is that the U.S. devoted a large amount of military resources to the training of 
a force that, upon the eruption of civil war in 1980, they hoped could defeat the 
insurgent forces of the FMLN. 
 
American training for Salvadoran soldiers was provided through three sources. The 
first of these, the Military Assistance Program (MAP), was the initial grant-based 
program that aided the development of the Salvadoran military. Between the passing 
of the Mutual Security Act (1951) and the late 1960s, MAP was the dominant 
component of military aid to Latin America as a whole.
107
 In 1976, Congress opted 
to phase out MAP assistance in favour of programs that were paid for by the country 
in question, and the MAP training segment became International Military Education 
and Training (IMET). This source of training for the Salvadorans was still based 
upon a grant system. Finally, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) allowed the Salvadoran 
government to purchase American arms, training, and technical support. 
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All of these programs were part of the effort by American administrations to 
influence the training of Salvadoran troops. IMET, however, was the primary 
method of dispensing U.S. influence onto ESAF. The basic purpose of the program, 
as noted in a Congressional presentation on the Security Assistance Program for 
financial year 1979, was rooted in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
108
 According 
to this earlier legislation, IMET was concerned with two primary goals. The first was 
to further international peace through the creation and maintenance of relations 
between the U.S. and foreign countries, whilst the second was to improve the self-
reliance of countries by helping them utilise their security resources, and those 
bought from the U.S., more effectively. During the Carter administration, officials 
added a third clause to this legislation, with the 1978 International Security Act 
declaring that IMET was to increase human rights recognition in nations 
participating in its activities.
109
 Though IMET was also regarded as a program 
capable of implementing U.S. foreign policy goals through interaction with foreign 
military leaders, this 1978 legislative caveat explicitly stated that American training 
programs were designed to instruct Salvadoran forces in human rights.
110
 
 
Such emphasis on human rights was part of a new period of self-examination for the 
U.S. By 1976 American society was struggling to come to terms with the apparent 
loss of moral direction that had struck the country during Vietnam, and then again 
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during the Watergate crisis.
111
 A re-examination of U.S. foreign and military policy 
occurred amid accusations that a failure to adequately suppress human rights 
violations in Vietnam was a fundamental reason for the failures of that war.
112
 
President Carter, who displayed a „moralistic fervor‟ over the matter, renewed 
America‟s dedication to human rights on his election to the presidency.113 During his 
administration, Salvadoran officers began to receive specific training at a secretive 
training program set up at American military schools in Panama. Regarded by 
American officials as „extremely sensitive‟ and „experimental‟, the training was 
designed to instruct these officers in the handling of guerrillas, whilst at the same 
time teaching them human rights.
114
 This reflected a genuine desire among US 
government personnel, especially within the State Department, to encourage the 
Salvadoran military to resist the temptation of firing at everything and anything in its 
operations. One State Department official hoped that such training would gradually 
have a cumulative effect on Salvadoran troops, leading to a more discriminating 
military strategy in the future.
115
 
 
Carter also used executive action to seek positive progress in the quest for human 
rights adherence in El Salvador. In 1977, he used presidential directives to purge the 
U.S. Army School of the Americas (USASOA) course list of the „Military 
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Intelligence‟, „Psychological Operations‟ and „Jungle Warfare‟ modules.116 Though 
information on the content of such courses is difficult to come by, the fact that Carter 
saw fit to personally direct their termination is perhaps testament to questionable 
ethical policies contained within. 
 
Following the excision of these dubious programs, troops sent to the USASOA in 
1980 were explicitly instructed in human rights. A specific three week course for 
several hundred ESAF lieutenants and captains commenced in August 1980, though 
American officials were hopeful, rather than sure, of its future influence on curbing 
human rights violations by ESAF.
117
 Ambassador Robert White, himself a vocal 
critic of American military intervention in the country and a stringent proponent of 
human rights, was sufficiently impressed with the proposed course content that he 
„strongly‟ recommended the reprogramming of money for the instruction.118 
 
Unfortunately for Carter, there was a tendency for his policies to be undermined by 
an inability to implement them effectively.
119
 In El Salvador, as had been the case in 
Vietnam, the nature of American military training weakened any legislative attempts 
to create a rigid human rights framework for troops. Formulated on the basis of 
contemporary military thought, U.S. training methods emphasised convention over 
this new focus on human rights and reform. Colonel John D. Waghelstein, 
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Commander of the U.S. Military Group in El Salvador between 1982 and 1983, and 
an advocate of counterinsurgency warfare, complained that even before the civil war 
erupted, Salvadoran troops were receiving conventional warfare training at the U.S. 
Army institutions they attended. By the late 1970s, counterinsurgency, in his 
opinion, was a „nonsubject.‟120 Restricted by their institution‟s own rigorous 
adherence to conventionality, U.S. Army advisors passed on to their Salvadoran 
clients the methodologies that had contributed to the slaughter of civilians in 
Vietnam. Training Salvadorans to act as a conventional force in a counterinsurgency 
environment weakened the barriers to atrocity by diminishing political and civil 
action programs, and emphasising the military component of the conflict.  
 
Personnel involved in the training of Salvadoran officers and enlisted soldiers were 
taken mainly from the Special Forces component of the U.S. Army. They were 
recruited and deployed to El Salvador as Military Training Teams (MTT). Even 
relatively innocuous training teams, such as a Logistics and Maintenance Support 
Team deployed in order to train the Salvadoran Army in the correct procedures for 
part replacements, were despatched from the Special Forces stationed at Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina.
121
 These MTTs constituted one of the most important aspects of the 
American training program in El Salvador. 
 
The first such team was inserted into El Salvador on 12 November 1979 in order to 
train Salvadorans in riot control.
122
 However, further teams were deployed to the 
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country as the American assistance program was scaled up, and by 30 November 
1981, within days of the massacre at El Mozote, eleven MTTs were involved in 
various aspects of the Salvadoran military.
123
 Units such as the Tactical Intelligence 
MTT and the Small Unit Training Teams were intimately involved in attempting to 
teach aggressive, small unit combat techniques to Salvadoran troops. The Small Unit 
Training Teams had the most direct contact with those troops leading the assaults on 
guerrilla forces, and crucially, with those who would commit the most egregious 
human rights violations. According to an MTT status report filed on 30 November 
1981, two Small Unit Training Teams, made up of five men each, had commenced 
the training cycle of eighty recruits for the Atlacatl Battalion.
124
  
 
McClintock contends that because MTTs were made up of U.S. Army Special Forces 
personnel they were counterinsurgency experts, and were „specialists in organizing 
and training irregular forces for irregular warfare; perhaps not the best teachers to 
impart either traditional concepts of military discipline, or to excite a great deal of 
enthusiasm for the rules and restrictions of conventional warfare.‟125 In fact U.S. 
Army Special Forces were far from specialists in irregular warfare, particularly 
during the initial years of the MTT program. With the reorientation of the Army in 
the 1970s, the Special Forces‟ mission had been re-aligned with conventional Army 
doctrine. Their stated purpose was to train indigenous resistance forces to support 
conventional operations.
126
 Special Forces were little different from the rest of the 
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U.S. Army in the aftermath of Vietnam, during which the focus on opposing Soviet 
advances in Europe led to troops not being trained in counterinsurgency strategy and 
tactics.
127
 
 
This conventionalism was shifted onto the Salvadoran units that MTTs interacted 
with. Rather than teaching specific counterinsurgency techniques, training focused 
on general infantry tactics, with little to no emphasis on the more complex nuances 
of counterinsurgency warfare. MTTs, who worked primarily with the Rapid Reaction 
Battalions (BIRIs), taught such basic skills as rifle marksmanship, first aid and 
communications.
128
 Even two years into the civil war, with guerrilla forces 
seemingly undiminished in strength, MTTs had failed to adapt to the rigours of 
counterinsurgency warfare in El Salvador, and were maintaining their focus on 
teaching ESAF strictly conventional U.S. Army tactics, with strictly conventional 
American weapons.  
 
Colonel Lyman Duryea, the U.S. Defense Attaché to El Salvador from 1983 to 1985, 
later admitted to frustration with the conventional, indiscriminate approach to 
combat by the Salvadorans, complaining that ESAF‟s use of 90mm recoilless rifles, 
mortars and .50 calibre machine guns was a pointless exercise that echoed 
ineffective U.S. airstrikes during Vietnam.
129
 Duryea failed to mention that it was the 
MTTs who provided instruction in such weapons systems. The fact that significant 
burn damage was discovered by the El Mozote investigation team, suggests that the 
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Atlacatl Battalion was not averse to deploying the explosive weapons they were 
trained in against civilians.
130
 
 
It is worth noting that the Atlacatl Battalion was one of the most notorious units of 
the Salvadoran conflict. As one of the specifically created BIRIs that were set up 
with the help of American forces, they have been singled out as examples of what 
American counterinsurgency training does to civilians. As well committing brutality 
at El Mozote, the Atlacatl Battalion also participated in attacks on civilians at the 
Gualsinga River in 1984,
131
 Los Llanitos in the summer of the same year,
132
 and in 
one of the most infamous cases of violence in El Salvador, the murder of the Jesuit 
priests in 1989.
133
 Those who link U.S. training to the violence in the country point 
to the actions of the Atlacatl as evidence of the dire effects of such education. 
 
In reality, the creation of BIRIs – such as the Atlacatl, Bellosa, and Atonal – was 
more about public relations than military realities. Though lauded by many 
observers, including the American media, as elite counterinsurgency units,
134
 these 
units actually received only marginally upgraded training programs from their 
assigned MTTs and visits to U.S. Army service schools. Basic infantry tactics - 
marksmanship, fire-and-manoeuvre techniques and communications - were the 
staple elements of their training under American instructors; it was, in the words of 
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the commanding officer of the 7
th
 Special Forces at Fort Bragg, „basic combat 
training similar to that given US (sic) soldiers.‟135 MTT personnel in country 
confessed to journalists that the reputation of the BIRIs as fearsome 
counterinsurgency units was wholly misplaced.
136
 
 
The limits of their abilities were later acknowledged by Ambassador Deane Hinton, 
who conceded that „as far as I could see, they lacked the concept of immediate 
reaction.‟137 Just like the rest of ESAF, the individual soldiers tasked to these „elite‟ 
units were often pressed into service, and scorned by the majority of officers.
138
 
Their willingness, and ability, to kill civilians in such large numbers was not forged 
from a counterinsurgency training program, but from the exhortations of particular 
officers and the conventionality of their training regime.
139
 Similarly, the training 
given to Salvadorans at military installations in the United States, particularly Fort 
Benning, concentrated on conventional infantry tactics and leadership skills.
140
 
 
Upon Reagan‟s election to the White House, American officials maintained that 
human rights training was an important component of the military effort in El 
Salvador. As part of the U.S. Army‟s training program for Salvadoran troops at Fort 
Benning, Georgia, journalist Michael Getler was granted restricted access to a highly 
controlled press event in April 1982. His subsequent article highlighted the extent of 
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human rights training for ESAF troops at the course, with thirty eight hours of 
specifically human rights based education included in the six hundred and eighteen 
hours of predominantly tactical instruction.
141
 This was alongside a specific course 
for officers in September 1982, and the U.S. Army‟s existing manuals on the laws of 
warfare which were made available to ESAF.
142
 This was clearly an increase in the 
attention given to human rights compared with Vietnam. 
 
However, the Reagan administration was more concerned about the extent to which 
ESAF‟s murderous record was impacting on domestic support for the President.143 In 
public, Reagan and his team sought to reassure Congress and the public that ESAF 
was reforming itself, but in private, Reagan‟s ideological rigidity in combating 
communism gave rise to dubious, even illegal, practices within the U.S. training 
program for ESAF. In particular, the re-emergence of the USASOA, after more than 
two decades of increasing insignificance in the general context of instruction for 
Latin American militaries, gave rise to an alarming set of incidents which 
undermined attempts to professionalise ESAF and emphasise human rights.
144
 
 
One of the most disturbing elements of the USASOA training program was the 
apparent willingness to sanction flagrantly illegal methods of countering opponents 
of the Salvadoran regime. Training manuals released by the Pentagon in 1996 
illuminate the murky depths to which the U.S. was willing to go in order to create 
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indigenous forces capable of defeating insurgents during Reagan‟s presidency. Seven 
specific manuals, entitled „Handling of Sources‟, „Counterintelligence‟, 
„Revolutionary War and Communist Ideology‟, „Terrorism and the Urban Guerrilla‟, 
„Interrogation‟, „Combat Intelligence‟ and „Analysis 1‟, were the subject of much 
scrutiny upon their declassification. Though much of their content is mundane, there 
are some startling suggestions that advocate highly suspect, and often illegal, 
methods of dealing with subversives. 
 
Despite the fact that U.S. officials who conducted an investigation into their content 
complained of a lack of context over such extracts, it is hard to dispute the brutality 
of the more extreme measures proposed. Truth serum, false imprisonment and the 
utilisation of fear as a motivator were suggested as viable tactics.
145
 The 
assassination of targets, hostile or otherwise, was also advocated as a solution to 
insurgency.
146
 In removing the distinction between hostile and non-hostiles, these 
manuals were essentially advocating the targeting of non-combatants as a legitimate 
means of defeating the FMLN.  
 
The manuals were representative of some course content at the USASOA during the 
1980s. Officers had compiled the manuals from the substance of the „Military 
Intelligence‟ module that USASOA had provided from 1982.147 Only four of the 
seven manuals were given out to students, and were only offered as additional 
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reading material for the Military Training course, available as a module twice 
between 1989 and 1991.
148
 Though such material was in violation of United States 
policy, nevertheless, between 1987 and 1991, the Department of Defense estimated 
that as many as one thousand copies of the manuals could have been distributed by 
MTT‟s within the SouthCom theatre, including at the USASOA.149 
 
The usage of torture manuals was not restricted to this one instance at the USASOA. 
Declassified National Security Archive documents point to links between Vietnam, 
the USASOA and these training manuals. Between 1965 and 1976 the USASOA 
provided training to Latin American troops, including Salvadoran forces, in which 
the use of dubious, even illegal, techniques for defeating the guerrillas were 
advocated. These techniques were the product of the Project X program, formed „to 
develop an exportable foreign intelligence training package to provide 
counterinsurgency techniques learned in Vietnam to Latin American countries.‟150 
 
The Carter administration had terminated this form of training in 1976, but it is 
highly likely that Salvadoran forces would have come into contact with it given their 
presence at the school prior to this date. It is also worth pointing out that Major Vic 
Tise, in a July 1991 conversation regarding this topic, noted that objectionable 
material had been authorised by Washington for use at the USASOA in 1982.
151
 Tise 
removed the material in question, but it is clear that highly suspect training methods 
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began to be sanctioned by Washington as the Reagan administration stepped up its 
military approach to El Salvador. In 1982, 587 Salvadoran troops were educated at 
USASOA, followed by 762 in 1983. By 1990, 6,207 ESAF members had received 
instruction at the institution. So great was the ESAF presence at the facility that one 
member of the Bolivian Army commented that „the School of the Americas was for 
Salvadorans.‟152 Such a large number of Salvadoran graduates of the facility 
combined with the presence of highly questionable training material suggested that 
the USASOA failed to adequately enforce human rights training for ESAF during 
the Reagan administration. 
 
However, even though Reagan‟s administration placed a reduced emphasis on 
human rights concerns, it is possible to go too far in assigning responsibility to the 
U.S for Salvadoran atrocities. Even Lesley Gill, who argues forcefully that the 
USASOA created soldiers capable of terrorism and brutality, admits that no direct 
evidence is available to link those graduates who committed atrocity in El Salvador 
to the training they received at the USASOA.
153
 The torture manuals on which Gill 
spends much of her time were not dispensed prior to 1987, nor has any documented 
evidence been uncovered that directly linked the USASOA, its Salvadoran pupils, 
and the massacres of civilians in their country. 
 
Gill has also rejected the assertion that a propensity for violence by native militaries 
themselves can explain atrocity.
154
 However, ESAF‟s attitude to violating human 
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rights was, alongside American training in conventionality, the most important factor 
in creating a force liable to target innocents during the civil war. Perhaps the chief 
contributor was the unprofessionalism of ESAF‟s recruitment and domestic training 
programs; processes which the United States had little influence over. ESAF recruits 
were taught to hold contempt for civilians, but offered few tactics for successfully 
combating guerrillas. This combination created soldiers more than willing to target 
anyone they came into contact with when executing operations. 
 
In theory, ESAF units were made up of recruits who, under Article 113 of the 1962 
constitution, were required to commit to a period of military service when between 
the ages of 18 and 30.
155
 In reality, units comprised almost any male that the 
Salvadoran military could force into service.  The vast majority of enlisted soldiers 
in ESAF were taken from the poor masses of Salvadoran society, and had been 
forced into the military against their will: observers reported that it was common for 
young men to be pulled from the streets, for example after a movie had finished.
156
 
One Salvadoran, who later emigrated to the United States, recalled that the 
Salvadoran Army‟s initial approach to recruitment in the area near where he lived 
was to stop anyone at the crossroads to San Juan las Minas, and simply conscript 
anyone over the age of 18; later, as the civil war progressed, the Army began to 
lower its „standards‟. One practice involved forcing male civilians to stand with a 
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rifle on their shoulder: if the rifle was not dragged, they were immediately sent to the 
Army.
157
 It became routine for boys as young as 14 to be engaged in combat.
158
 
 
The Woerner Report maintained that „recruitment goals for enlisted members are 
consistently exceeded‟,159 but what the report missed was that Salvadoran males 
often had little alternative but to enter the murderous clutches of the military. 
American advisors regarded the conditions in which Salvadoran enlisted troops 
served as being close to negligent,
160
 but this attitude failed to take into account the 
incredible poverty that affected the majority of Salvadorans. Without any other 
employment option, these men were willing to stay for the meagre pay and the meal 
the Army provided.
161
  
 
Given that the majority of recruits were taken from the very poor masses that were 
being targeted by the military in its murderous campaign, it would seem surprising 
that troops were willing to engage in extreme violence against their own social 
group. However, ESAF was quick to instil in its recruits a bitter hatred for those the 
military regarded as a threat to the status quo in El Salvador. Soldiers‟ disdain for 
civilians, particularly the rural campesino produced an utter disregard for human life 
in the Salvadoran Army; an attitude implanted into recruits from an early point in 
their military career. During a four day trip to San Salvador, Reverend William 
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Wipfler of the office of human rights of the National Council of Churches observed 
recruits chanting „Kill the people, kill the people‟ during calisthenics.162 Similarly, 
Karen DeYoung, a Washington Post journalist who attended the training camps of 
the Salvadoran Army in May 1979, claimed that Salvadoran troops were explicitly 
told to engage those members of the clergy who displayed non-conformist traits, 
such as non-clerical clothing, or even, bizarrely, those playing guitars or having 
beards.
163
 Consequently, training for Salvadoran troops displayed an indiscriminate 
approach to the targets in the war, but also made explicit demands on its soldiers to 
target „un-patriotic‟ portions of society. 
 
When not explicitly instructing their troops to kill civilians and undesired sectors of 
Salvadoran society, ESAF was thrusting its troops into combat without any training 
whatsoever. The Woerner Report was particularly scathing in its analysis of the 
training regime for recruits, noting that a focus on fighting the FMLN had „resulted 
in the suspension of most formal training programs and the relegation of training, in 
practise, to secondary importance.‟164 The decision by the Salvadoran military to 
engage with its immediate security problems meant that even those units who 
received American advisors, like the BIRIs, sometimes suffered from incomplete 
training regimes.
165
 A 31 March 1982 status update on the Infantry Battalion Phase 1 
In-Country Individual Training MTT noted that its attempts were being hampered by 
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„operations requirements which had priority‟ which meant training itself was 
sporadic.
166
 
 
Thus, ESAF‟s own policies and strategic decisions had created a force which was 
already predisposed towards violence prior to American involvement, and even 
when U.S. advisors were engaged in seeking to influence Salvadoran units, they 
were often stymied by Salvadoran dynamics. Salvadorans expressed resentment 
towards the advisors sent to aid them, and this weakened the impact American 
instructors had. Some indigenous troops felt American assistance was an 
infringement on Salvadoran sovereignty.
167
 Other members of ESAF, particularly 
amongst the officer corps, felt the tactics and strategy impressed upon them by U.S. 
advisors was ineffective in this particular conflict, and that sweeping repression was 
the means of not only defeating the insurgency militarily, but was also an important 
method of generating fear in the remaining population.
168
 
 
This was not merely a contemporary attitude. During the Matanza the nation‟s 
combat leaders had forcefully rejected American assistance. When a U.S. Navy 
squadron relayed a query asking if assistance was required, El Salvador‟s leaders 
quickly answered with a resolute no. In their eyes the threat of American interference 
was only marginally more appealing than the leftist uprising they were in the midst 
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of subjugating.
169
 During the 1980s, U.S. advisors were more than aware of such 
attitudes. One noted that „You have to be very careful how you give advice... If you 
give it like an order, it doesn‟t work. This is their war and they don‟t let you forget 
it.‟170 
 
An inability to influence their charges on the training ground is perhaps one reason 
as to why some American advisors adopted a more hands-on approach. A handful of 
documented cases noted the presence of American advisors out in the field with 
ESAF units. During the early stages of 1982, in an operation to reconstruct a 
demolished bridge in the Usulután department, five U.S. Army personnel were found 
to have joined their Salvadoran counterparts in the field, as well as carrying rifles 
during the course of their transgression. Lt. Col. Harry Melander, whom the 
American Ambassador to El Salvador described as a „first-class officer who made a 
mistake‟, was recalled from the country, whilst the other U.S. Army troops involved 
received reprimands.
171
 In the same year, it was alleged by members of ESAF during 
a CBS newscast that American troops had engaged in combat with guerrilla forces at 
a base guarding the Lempa River railway bridge.
172
 
 
These incidents represented flagrant breaches of the terms of reference for advisors. 
The regulations provided to American military personnel conducting training 
operations were quite explicit in the limitations that were to be imposed upon their 
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actions there. Amongst some of the key regulations were demands that U.S. military 
personnel not go on patrols with ESAF, place themselves in situations where combat 
was considered likely or wear the traditional symbol of American Special Forces: the 
green beret.
173
 The regulations had an important political dynamic which reflected 
the deep seated fears within the American public, and Congress, of a return to a 
Vietnam quagmire in the counterinsurgency conflicts of Central America.
174
 Much 
of the focus revolved around the issue of American troops in a combat role in El 
Salvador, and the Reagan administration was keen not to stir up the painful 
memories of America‟s recent military debacle in South East Asia. Thus, the terms 
of reference for advisors in El Salvador were stringent, and though the restrictions on 
movement were a source of considerable frustration for many advisors,
175
 they 
reflected political considerations back in Washington D.C. 
 
However, given that the American assistance program for El Salvador was of a 
highly covert nature, and given the dangerous security situation in the country itself, 
the advisory positions offered within the U.S. Army often attracted more aggressive 
candidates. John Ellerson, who commanded the U.S. Military Group effort in El 
Salvador from 1986 to 1988, noted that that it was sometimes necessary for the U.S. 
military to stop advisors from becoming „cowboys‟, given the aggressive type of 
character that the covert, dangerous assignment attracted.
176
  These regulations were 
therefore also an attempt by the United States, from an early stage in the civil war, to 
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limit any possible unauthorised training by its advisors. The fact that some were 
willing to breach these rules perhaps indicates the extent to which individual 
American advisors felt themselves to be restricted by their own government and 
marginalised by the Salvadorans they were teaching. 
 
American influence was further eroded by the transitional nature of the MTT system. 
As in Vietnam, the rotational nature of serving in El Salvador produced a lack of 
institutional memory. Stanley commented on the ability of Salvadoran officers to 
„manipulate, sweet-talk, mislead, and betray their U.S patrons with panache and 
impunity‟ with regards to the shifting diplomatic staff that transited in and out of the 
country throughout the period.
177
 The same can be argued for the MTT personnel 
who came into contact with Salvadoran officers, and troops, who were resentful of 
U.S. interference in what they regarded as their own war. Advisors served only 
twelve months in country,
178
 and just as in Vietnam, this allowed only limited 
exposure to the full nature of the problems of counterinsurgency. Both American 
military and diplomatic staff recognised the futility of this approach to the situation. 
General Wallace H. Nutting, the Commander of SouthCom from 1979 to 1983, 
disliked the policy,
179
 and Thomas Pickering, who served as the U.S. Ambassador 
from 1983 to 1985, later asserted that the „thing I fought like hell for, and had an 
enormous problem with, was longer tours for military people.‟180 
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Without a sustained presence in Salvadoran units, American influence was 
diminished and countermanded by Salvadoran officers. In the case of the Atlacatl 
Battalion this allowed a unit trained and armed in American military conventionality 
to be used by a commanding officer, Domingo Monterrosa, who was aggressive and 
hard-line.
181
 This was merely one problem with the American training program in El 
Salvador. When put alongside the conflicting messages on human rights and basic 
misconceptions over the level of professionalism in ESAF, it is little wonder that one 
U.S. Defense Attaché resignedly believed that, in 1986, the United States was still 
looking at a minimum of twenty years before positive changes emerged in ESAF.
182
 
 
The importance of proper training in deterring human rights abuses should not be 
underestimated. Jordan J. Paust passionately urged that „human beings must 
ultimately receive the proper education, training and guidance to attenuate the evils 
of violence and make human rights more effective.‟183 His plea, contained in an 
article of such lucidity and impact that it was cited by the court in United States v 
Calley, is a stark pointer to the behaviour that can occur in combat when such 
education is lacking during the formative stages of a soldier‟s career. The 
effectiveness of human rights in Vietnam and El Salvador was substantially limited 
by the training undergone by U.S. and Salvadoran militaries. 
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Though many U.S. Army soldiers gratefully acknowledged the tactical benefits of 
their training regime,
184
 the limitations of such instruction became clear in the 
actions of those who killed civilians in Vietnam. The Army had neglected to fully 
impart the necessity of adherence to human rights and international treaties upon its 
own members in the opening stages of their military careers, opting to sacrifice 
ethical behaviour in favour of aggression and conventional military characteristics. 
 
In El Salvador, as Lars Schoultz points out, it is impossible to say with any degree of 
certainty that the training provided by U.S. forces to Salvadoran troops caused them, 
directly or indirectly, to carry out brutal human rights violations.
185
 However, the 
conventionality of U.S. military doctrine taught an already poorly created and 
maintained indigenous force the wrong lessons. Though U.S. Army MTTs and 
service schools increased their instructions in human rights for ESAF pupils, their 
work was undermined by lapses in judgement from other elements of the American 
assistance effort – most notably the authors of the training manuals propagated 
during the 1980s at the USASOA. Individual advisors also displayed poor judgement 
in accompanying ESAF units into the field and providing personal judgement on the 
strategy to be utilised. 
 
Removing the limitations and counter-balances against atrocity that lie in a human 
being was not the express purpose of training for Vietnam and El Salvador, but it 
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was nevertheless the by-product of the regimes implemented in the basic training 
allocated to American and Salvadoran soldiers. It taught them the skills required to 
kill, and sought to provide justifications for heightened aggression. Philip Caputo, 
whose A Rumor of War remains one of the most lucid and thought-provoking tales of 
the Vietnam War, recalled that despite gaining all the positive benefits of military 
service from their training – courage, loyalty and esprit de corps – he and his fellow 
soldiers paid the price of „a diminished capacity for compassion.‟186  Training sent 
soldiers into a maelstrom of violence and brutality with the skills to join in, but 
limited their capacity to resist. 
 
 
‘You‟d gone to gladiator school.’187 
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Chapter 3: Conducting Conventional Warfare 
 
„The United States entered the Vietnam War with a doctrine well suited to fighting 
conventional war in Europe, but worse than useless for the counterinsurgency it was 
about to combat.‟188 – John A. Nagl. 
 
Nagl‟s brutal assessment of the US Army during the Vietnam War is of crucial 
importance to understanding how atrocity could occur in the environments that 
Vietnam and El Salvador presented to U.S. and Salvadoran soldiers. For the armies 
that operated in these two conflicts, their inability to conduct a sustained, viable and 
effective counterinsurgency program was not only a damning indictment of their 
approach to these wars, but was also a powerful factor in the atrocities committed 
there. The opening chapter of this thesis noted that counterinsurgency was 
marginalised in both conflicts, in favour of conventional warfare. This chapter will 
build on this, assessing how conventional doctrine translated into the tactics used by 
soldiers during combat in Vietnam and El Salvador. 
 
Since defending the population was regarded as a secondary concern behind 
conducting aggressive anti-guerrilla operations, units in Vietnam were less inclined 
to plan and implement operations that placed the safety of civilians at the forefront of 
their thinking. A number of units in Vietnam executed operations that, if not 
deliberately targeting non-combatants, made little effort to restrain the enormous 
levels of firepower that were unleashed upon objectives. Clearly the Americal 
Division in its operation in My Lai was one such force. Elsewhere in Vietnam, the 
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emphasis on attrition fuelled indiscriminate operations by a variety of forces, ranging 
in size and scope. In the Mekong Delta, as part of IV Corps, the 9
th
 Infantry Division 
implemented a campaign that was the apotheosis of U.S. Army policy. At the behest 
of its commanding officer, Major General Julian Ewell, the division created a vast 
array of statistical categories for the purpose of determining success and failure, not 
only in terms of the war‟s progression, but also for evaluating the specific 
performances of individual units and their officers. Ewell was brutal in his criteria 
for his men, stating that, „if a battalion saw that some other battalion was getting four 
hundred or six hundred kills a month, and they were getting fifty, they‟d 
immediately think, I‟d better get off my ass and do something.‟189 
 
Maximising the body count was thus not simply a matter of meeting strategic 
demands; commanding officers such as Ewell also regarded it as a necessary step for 
career progression. The pressure created for subordinate officers was therefore 
substantial, and led to the bending, and breaking, of the accepted norms of combat. 
Krepinevich noted that in one confidential interview, the participant – a former 
member of the 9
th
 Infantry – recalled one officer in the division „literally flying the 
blades off the helicopters and killing Americans to increase the body count.‟190 The 
same source also claimed, in brutally honest fashion, that „we really blew a lot of 
civilians away.‟191 
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The 9
th
 Infantry Division was particularly prone to use helicopters as assault 
components. Ewell defended his division‟s use of helicopters in his own self-
congratulatory Sharpening the Combat Edge, during which he used a wealth of 
statistical indicators on the effectiveness of air combat assets to try to prove his case 
that aerial support produced more effective combat operations.
192
 
 
Ewell‟s innumerable data confirms greater numbers of enemy were killed when air 
assets were used, but he neglects to mention that his approach to combat from the air 
precluded the identifying of genuine enemy combatants and that eyewitnesses to the 
9
th
 Infantry‟s aerial assaults were hugely critical of the indiscriminate nature of these 
operations.
193 
The 9
th
 Infantry‟s approach to combat represented a slow-burning My 
Lai, one in which civilian casualties were inflicted over a much greater period of 
time, and often from a more distant platform, but with equal disregard for civilian 
life. Further North in Quang Ngai, this approach was condensed into operations of 
short, sharp brutality, but over a sustained period of time that raised serious 
questions about the levels of oversight in the U.S. Army, and about the way in which 
soldiers were obliged to prosecute the war. 
 
In 2003, the Toledo Blade newspaper published the results of an eight month 
investigation into the actions of Tiger Force, a specifically created U.S. Army unit 
that operated in Vietnam as a specialised reconnaissance unit for the 101
st
 Airborne. 
Working from interviews and a vast array of Army documents, logs and reports - 
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many recently declassified – the newspaper uncovered the activities of Tiger Force, 
the extent of which had not been previously known. The unit, a 45 man platoon, 
„violently lost control.‟194 It embarked on a sustained campaign of murder, 
deliberately targeting civilians. Spurred on by officers who actively encouraged the 
brutality, and unrestrained by the lack of oversight or judicial investigation by the 
Army, the unit murdered a large number of civilians during its time in Quang Ngai 
province. 
 
The experiences of the 9
th
 Infantry and Tiger Force neatly encapsulate the Vietnam 
environment. In the former‟s case, the entire Army concept – „counterinsurgency 
American-style‟ – was illustrated in all its indiscriminate glory. In the latter‟s case, 
we can see how particularly experiences and specific unit deficiencies combined 
with the powerful dynamics of Vietnam to create chaos and tragedy. It is intriguing 
to note that Tiger Force operated within 10 miles of Task Force Barker, the 
subordinate unit of the Americal Division which committed the massacre at My Lai. 
Both were based in Quang Ngai, at the same logistical camp, and both executed 
similar search-and-destroy missions in the volatile northern province. Quang Ngai 
represented the worst of Vietnam for U.S. troops, and was regarded by those who 
served there as a particularly difficult region
195
. It was an unforgiving location, far 
enough North to contain infiltrating regular main force enemy units, but with part of 
the populated coastal plain running along its Eastern shoreline, it also offered a 
worthwhile target for the hamlet-orientated terror of the Viet Cong. Troops faced the 
knowledge that the enemy was very much in the region, but frequently faced little 
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definite contact. As such, it would have proved a fertile breeding ground for atrocity, 
and it seems that on multiple occasions, brutality burst forth in savage misconduct. 
 
Given that the combat environment in Vietnam was so volatile, the issue of military 
justice becomes crucial. Punishments and threats of punishment act as a deterrent, 
restraining soldiers‟ actions in situations where civilian law is clearly inapplicable. 
The evidence from the examples of Tiger Force and Task Force Barker suggest that 
military justice failed to act as a constraining influence. From the beginning of the 
intervention in Vietnam, military lawyers were deployed as part of the American 
effort. The peculiar mix of circumstances in Vietnam – a counterinsurgency war, an 
effort at nation-building, the combination of Vietnamese and American civilian, 
government and military agencies – meant that the issue of law was of particular 
importance during both the advisory and intervention years.
196
 Moreover, there was 
no unified legal department in the US military. Each command and each unit had its 
own legal representatives. Whilst Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) 
employed lawyers as part of its overall command of the American presence in 
Vietnam, the US Army as a subordinate command employed its own legal staff with 
a separate brief and jurisdiction.  
 
The introduction of combat troops resulted in the divergence of the military justice 
system in Vietnam, producing in a more streamlined MACV legal staff, which 
transferred the work of courts-martial prosecution and defence into the hands of the 
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U.S. Army‟s own Judge Advocate General‟s Corps (JAG).197 As such, it was the 
U.S. Army‟s legal staff that bore primary responsibility for making sure that the 
system of courts-martial was implemented effectively. Indeed, according to Borch, 
courts-martial made up the majority of the U.S. Army‟s legal staff‟s workload.198 
Their influence on the proceedings ranged from direct representation to indirect 
advisory roles, as in the case of special courts-martial, in which non-legal staff 
would require guidance from a professional. Between 1965 and 1969, approximately 
25,000 courts-martial were convened, though a large number of these were for 
relatively minor infractions.
199
   
 
The sheer number of courts-martial would seem to suggest a competent judicial 
system, but the statistics do not tell the whole tale. Whilst a great many cases were 
tried before the relevant military authorities, the U.S. Army displayed, at best, a 
remarkable tolerance for unrestrained combat operations, and at worst simply looked 
the other way as members of its service committed cold-blooded murder. Officials, 
some in JAG office itself, knew of explicit violations of the rules of war, yet refused 
to investigate because it would have been seen as inhibiting practical combat 
tactics.
200
 Such leniency was a barrier to the effective implementation of military 
justice, but even when very serious incidents were flagged to the necessary legal 
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authorities there was often a disturbing unwillingness to investigate the matter 
promptly and fully.
201
  
 
Far from being a short-term issue, this lack of thorough and publicly documented 
investigations into war-crimes in Vietnam was a prolonged issue that reached into 
the 1970s and beyond. The Toledo Blade‟s investigation into the Tiger Force unit not 
only focused on the behaviour of the unit itself, but also on the subsequent failure of 
US Army investigators to conduct a comprehensive inquiry. Having received a tip in 
1971 from Sgt. Gary Coy that a member of Tiger Force had decapitated a 
Vietnamese infant, the Army‟s investigative branch was mandated to investigate the 
complaint. Lasting four and a half years, the investigation into the matter underlined 
the extent to which the Army focused on forgetting Vietnam. Set procedures were 
ignored, as Army personnel conducting the inquiry failed in many of the basic tasks 
required of them. Army members suspected of performing illegal acts whilst serving 
with Tiger Force were allowed to leave the service, thereby negating the Army‟s 
ability to compel them to testify. Victims were not interviewed, nor were witnesses. 
Perhaps most shocking of all was the fact that Tiger Force members stated to the 
Toledo Blade that Army investigators sought to cover up the crimes, seeking to 
persuade witnesses to claim ignorance of the events, so that, in the words of one 
Army investigator, „I can get the thing over with.‟202 In doing so, the Army offered 
few disincentives for breaching the rules of war. 
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Whilst such criminally negligent attitudes and actions were not uniform throughout 
the Army in the post-Vietnam period, they did represent part of the „Vietnam 
Syndrome‟ which infected the Army – and America as a nation – in the years after 
the war. Though Reagan would defend the „noble cause‟ of Vietnam during his 1980 
campaign,
203
 the conduct of the war had left Americas wary of getting involved in a 
similar fight again. Such public caution, however, did not stop the Carter 
administration, and then the Reagan government, from supporting a war in El 
Salvador that bore many of the tactical hallmarks of Vietnam. 
 
 
„I can not see inside the house from which someone is shooting at me; nor in those 
circumstances am I very disposed to waste time trying to find out who else might be 
in the house.‟ 204 – Colonel Domingo Monterrosa. 
 
 
U.S. assistance to El Salvador was of a conventional nature, based, as noted in the 
opening chapter, around the American military‟s emphasis on regular warfare in the 
aftermath of Vietnam. American influence on ESAF‟s combat operations sprang out 
of this philosophy. The area in which the United States had perhaps the greatest 
influence on the conduct of the Salvadoran military was in the supply of war 
materiel. American arms and ammunition had flowed into El Salvador throughout 
the post-war period. The United States Office of Public Safety had instituted a 
program in 1957 that provided weapons and equipment for the police in the country, 
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with the assistance shifting to the National Guard in 1963. Though the program was 
terminated in 1974, after providing 2045 carbines and revolvers plus 775,000 rounds 
of ammunition,
205
 it was an early example of the flow of weapons from the United 
States to El Salvador. Although El Salvador rejected American military aid in 1977, 
in protest over what it perceived as undue criticism of its human rights policies, the 
outbreak of hostilities in 1980 led to the resumption of arms transfers between the 
two countries.  
 
It was through the supply of war material that the effects of the United States‟ 
conventional military strategy were most clearly felt. Modern, but unsuitable, 
weapons systems were introduced; notably the helicopter, which came to represent 
the „inescapable sign of the US stamp that is beginning to emerge on this dismal and 
ugly little Central American war.‟206 Ironically, their transfer was originally intended 
as a bargaining chip in the Carter administration‟s fight to curb human rights 
violations by the Salvadoran armed forces. The offer to provide the helicopters – six 
UH-1Hs – was „made on the understanding that the JRG (Revolutionary Governing 
Junta) and the military high command will take specific measures to reduce and 
effectively bring under control the indiscriminate violence which emanates from 
elements of the armed forces.‟207 In reality, though, the provision of airmobile assets 
to ESAF provided greater capacity for bloodshed. Some of the most notorious 
massacres were dependent on the mobility provided by helicopters. On 30 August 
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1984, the Atlacatl Battalion cordoned off villagers near the Gualsinga River through 
the use of helicopters, before proceeding to open fire on hundreds of the stranded 
people.
208
 In May 1980, soldiers from multiple elements of the Salvadoran military 
targeted civilians attempting to flee into Honduras across the Sumpul River, 
engaging directly from two helicopters and killing 300 non-combatants.
209
 
Helicopters were even used for the benefit of unofficial militarised killing units, for 
example in the evacuation of one death squad who had killed a number of peasants 
before raping and decapitating one young girl in Santa Helena.
210
 
 
Though the United States was not responsible for the use of helicopters by 
Salvadoran units, it was naive and misguided for the Carter and Reagan 
administrations to provide such transportation for a military as unprofessional as 
ESAF. Not only were they a platform from which greater levels of indiscriminate 
violence could be employed against defenceless civilians, but they further 
emphasised an unproductive, conventional approach to the conflict.  Ironically, 
senior American advisors in El Salvador were dubious about the use of helicopters. 
One even admitted to doubts over the efficiency of air power in counterinsurgency 
wars, stating that „there‟s no substitute for the soldier on the ground talking to a 
campesino.‟211 
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As with helicopters, the provision of huge quantities of heavy infantry weapons also 
encouraged conventional attrition-based strategies. The supply of individual and 
crew serviced weapons and the necessary ammunition was a crucial part of the 
United States‟ assistance program to the country and an area of the conflict in which 
the American influence on tactics was especially notable. Particularly sizeable 
following Reagan‟s election to the presidency, supplies of infantry firearms became 
one of the most important examples of American aid for the Salvadoran officers in 
charge of the civil war‟s operations. It was something of a disappointment for 
American advisors when Salvadoran troops favoured employing these weapons in 
long-distance, fire-and-hope operations rather than specific small unit raids on the 
guerrillas and their bases. Some advisors admitted to frustration, arguing that the 
Salvadorans were using weapons simply because they were in the arsenal. Having 
been armed in such a way by American forces, the Salvadorans perceived that „the 
approved solution is to mount the .50 and hammer away at the next hillside, much in 
the same manner as in Vietnam when we pounded places with air strikes to 
absolutely no avail.‟212 However, despite the occasional astute observation from 
individuals, American advisors aided ESAF with their Tables of Organisation and 
Equipment, and by extension placed such weaponry in the hands of Salvadoran 
troops.
213
 
 
It is notable that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), in a 14 January 1981 
commentary on the situation in El Salvador, made mention of the presence of heavy 
weapons in the conflict. Rather than advocating the continuing procurement of such 
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weapons systems, the DIA noted that „heavy weapons possessed by the government 
– i.e., artillery, armored vehicles, and jet aircraft – have limited utility and are largely 
neutralized by terrain and the nature of the conflict.‟214 Such analysis suggests a 
fissure in the American assistance program; one agency recognising the futility of 
such armaments, other agencies actively placing these weapons in the arsenals of 
Salvadoran units on operations. It is a point picked up on by many who were actively 
involved in the United States presence in El Salvador.
215
 The absence of a unified 
command structure for the American effort,
216
 contributed to the continuing supply 
of inappropriate weapons systems despite the doubts expressed by observers like the 
DIA and Colonel Duryea. 
 
Heavy weapons systems were not the only contributory factor to massacre in El 
Salvador. Ballistics evidence from the site of the massacre at El Mozote points to the 
prevalence and extensive use of American small arms in ESAF operations. Of the 
two hundred and forty five cartridge cases collected from the El Mozote site by a 
team of Argentine forensic anthropologists in a 1992 investigation, one hundred and 
eighty four had a readable headstamp which located their production in Lake City, 
Missouri.
217
 The American forensic experts who analysed the Argentineans‟ findings 
also concluded that all but one of the weapons used to fire the projectiles were M-16 
rifles, manufactured in the United States.
218
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It could be argued that the presence of American weapons systems in the conflict in 
El Salvador was not in and of itself a deciding factor in ESAF‟s decision to engage 
in massacring civilians. ESAF received military materiel from other sources than the 
United States during the 1970s. Israel was a particularly important contributor to El 
Salvador‟s military arsenal, providing fighter bombers in 1975 to the Salvadoran air 
force,
219
 as well as Uzi sub-machine-guns and 80mm rocket launchers.
220
 Both 
France and Brazil also provided weapons systems.
221
 For much of the 1970s, the 
Belgian G-3 rifle was the standard infantry weapon for Salvadoran troops,
222
 and 
ammunition was bought in large quantities from Belgium and Yugoslavia.
223
 In a 
nation in which the machete was historically prevalent as a weapon,
224
  ESAF would 
surely have found the means from other nations, as well as through its own low-tech 
approach, to execute its policy of massacre and terror during the civil war. 
 
At the very least, though, failing to use the military procurement relationship to 
effectively push ESAF towards counterinsurgency strategies meant the U.S. missed 
an opportunity. Instead, the United States provided a large proportion of the weapons 
and ammunition required for the Salvadoran military to engage in brutality and 
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terror. In addition to being involved in the direct procurement process, the United 
States authorised private contractors to supply the Salvadoran military. Between 
fiscal year 1971 and 1980, the State Department‟s Office of Munitions Control 
permitted two million dollars worth of arms sales between American weapons 
companies and the Salvadoran military.
225
 Between 1975 and 1978 alone, over 
twenty million rifle, handgun and machinegun cartridges were sold to El Salvador by 
American firms.
226
 Such vast quantities of ammunition provided ESAF with more 
than enough firepower to escalate the brutality of its operations. American military 
officers had a crucial influence within the process of selling weapons to foreign 
nations.
227
 As such, the post-Vietnam military‟s conventional outlook was also likely 
to have had an impact on these commercial weapons sales. Even when not directly 
supplying arms or training assistance, the U.S. military establishment was 
reinforcing conventionality in ESAF through its presence in the U.S. government‟s 
commercial arms procurement bureaucracy. 
 
The problem for the United States was that it was engaged in a military effort 
alongside an ally which was stunningly brutal in its approach to warfare, and 
wracked by division and ineffectiveness. It is difficult to comprehend just how 
unprofessional the Salvadoran military was in its approach to defeating opponents, 
both preceding the civil war and during the bloody years of official conflict. 
Historical precedents had mixed with contemporary requirements to create a military 
force that had no qualms about employing a strategy of deliberate massacre. The 
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United States failed through ineffectiveness, misunderstanding and often 
unwillingness in its attempts to change the strategic trajectory of an organisation 
which had evolved over the course of the twentieth century into a brutal purveyor of 
state terror. The soldiers who committed massacre during the civil war did so as a 
result of a strategy that, whilst dependent on American material assistance and 
toleration, was primarily the product of Salvadoran factors. 
 
The toleration of brutality in ESAF was not a matter of lazy commanders, unwilling 
to examine the behaviour of their troops. It was a calculated attitude, which not only 
reinforced the bonds of loyalty within the military, but also helped ESAF to wage the 
kind of war that it deemed necessary to defeat the insurgents – or at least terrorise the 
population into submission. The U.S. Army was perfectly aware of this, with 
Woerner noting that the Army displayed a „remarkable capacity for tolerating 
unprofessional and improper conduct which does not threaten the institution.‟228 
 
Whilst the security forces and their unofficial death squad offshoots, had employed a 
selective approach in countering leftists during the 1960s and 1970s, eliminating 
individual rural leadership elements along with traditional urban foes such as trade 
unionists, lawyers and religious leaders, the onset of civil war in 1980 brought about 
a shift to a much more general level of repression.
229
 Faced with a militarised foe in 
the shape of the FMLN, the Army deliberately targeted vast swathes of the 
countryside in an effort to eradicate support for the guerrillas, as well as to destroy 
the guerrilla forces themselves. ESAF units armed themselves with heavy weaponry 
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and set off on search-and-destroy operations in the countryside. Upon entering the 
operational area, ESAF units would engage in futile attempts to locate, pin down and 
destroy concentrations of guerrillas. The rebels, who were in the process of 
perfecting insurgency themselves, engaged ESAF on their own terms and inflicted 
embarrassing levels of damage on the American-backed Salvadoran military. When 
the guerrillas withdrew - more often than not this was a voluntary decision rather 
than a necessity - the Army was left isolated in dangerous, remote locations. 
Frustrated, eager to lighten their loads of ammunition, and commanded by brutal 
leadership elements, ESAF troops often opted to open fire on those they were able to 
find: civilians. Satisfied that they had successfully cleansed the area of „subversives‟, 
the Army duly departed, leaving the guerrilla forces to infiltrate back, overwhelming 
any token patrols left by the Army and taking control of the region once more.
230
 
 
The emotional impact of these operations will be discussed in the final chapter, but 
from an operational point of view, such chaotic policy loosened the restraints on 
soldiers acting out of turn. Osiel has argued that the organisation of soldiers prior to, 
and during, combat is the most important factor in seeking to prevent atrocity.
231
 It is 
clear that in relation to ESAF‟s behaviour in the field, the poorly constructed and 
maintained system of warfare that was implemented can take a huge portion of the 
responsibility for the actions of soldiers at places like El Mozote. 
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The Woerner Report recognised that the greatest problem facing ESAF was its 
command control mechanisms.
232
 During the initial years of the civil war, El 
Salvador was separated into military zones, each of which was made up of three 
departments. Each department contained three infantry battalions. The commanding 
officer of each military zone, a full colonel, was also the local Brigade commander. 
American advisors were critical of this, and believed that the position required a 
General.
233
 However, under Salvadoran tradition, the department commanders 
maintained a staggering degree of autonomy in how they conducted operations, even 
to the extent of circumventing the Brigade commander and going straight to the High 
Command for clarification of orders.
234
 
 
This allowed only limited oversight. Departmental commanders could utilise their 
forces in whatever manner suited them. Thus, commanders essentially became 
„warlords‟, exercising their right to fight the rebels in whatever manner they deemed 
appropriate.
235
 Limited oversight was not restricted to the organisation of the 
command structure, however. Vital links which could preclude indiscriminate 
assaults on civilians were non-existent in El Salvador. Aerial power, as previously 
noted, had a devastating effect on the level of civilian casualties. The application of 
air assets was based around a system of command and control that was „archaic and 
ineffective.‟236 Fighter-bombers were utilised to deploy large munitions against 
guerrilla concentrations, but without any communications with ground units, pilots 
                                                 
232
 Woerner Report, p. 39. 
233
 Interview with Colonel Duryea, El Salvador at War, p. 298. 
234
 Interview with Colonel Duryea, El Salvador at War, p. 299. 
235
 Washington Post, 21 June 1982. 
236
 Woerner Report, p. 5-3. 
79 
 
were essentially blind when it came to targeting. This lack of control over air assets 
was compounded by ESAF‟s willingness to employ aerial bombing strategies against 
civilian areas. The United States had supplied 500-lb bombs for the Salvadoran Air 
Force,
237
 and ESAF was not averse to dropping these weapons on civilian areas. One 
week prior to the massacre at El Mozote an ESAF plane had delivered two bombs in 
the vicinity of the village, though no casualties were suffered that time.
238
 
 
Poor command and control policies were also reflected in the chaotic scenes which 
greeted U.S. advisors when they first encountered the war effort upon their arrival. 
The Salvadoran military had little self-control when it came to engaging guerrillas. 
In one bizarre technique, soldiers would clamber into trucks at the first sign of an 
engagement, tear off up the nearest highway towards the action, only to be cut down 
by carefully orchestrated guerrilla ambushes. One American noted this was a 
consistent approach, „partly out of bravado, and partly for lack of a better 
solution.‟239 Unfortunately, such an approach produced damaging levels of casualties 
in the ESAF ranks. Between 1 January 1981 and 5 October 1981, seven of the 
Army‟s eighteen brigade/battalion sized units suffered over 10% casualty rates.240 
This was a staggering, and demoralising, level of attrition for a military backed by 
the United States and fighting a guerrilla force in its own backyard. It fuelled anger 
towards the guerrillas, contributed to the requirement to deploy untrained soldiers 
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immediately into combat, and left ESAF weakened in its force deployment across 
the country. 
 
Military operations in El Salvador were aided by an utter lack of judicial oversight in 
the country. The justice system was corrupt, ineffectual and completely dependent 
upon the will of the military. The opening years of the war saw civilian deaths at 
their highest. In 1981 alone, Christian Legal Aid estimated there were 12,500 
civilian deaths.
241
 Yet in September 1982, U.S. embassy staff in El Salvador were 
forced to admit that the highest ranked officer charged and processed through the 
courts for atrocities was a lieutenant, and that despite their efforts to find quantifiable 
data to satisfy the curious members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
embassy staff could find no evidence to show that anyone in ESAF had been 
convicted of human rights abuses.
242
 Claiming that the lack of data was a 
jurisdictional issue, relating to the vast array of courts that existed in El Salvador, the 
embassy personnel were still forced to admit, in the same confidential cable, that 
future convictions were extremely unlikely for any of the Army members who had 
actually been charged with human rights abuses. 
 
This is a remarkable state of events, considering that by 24 September 1982, the date 
of the cable, the level of violence within El Salvador was already staggeringly high, 
and that a number of El Salvador‟s most notorious massacres had already occurred – 
El Mozote, Sumpul River, and Lempa River. Nevertheless, American staff in El 
Salvador continued to argue that the Salvadoran justice system was operational. The 
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Annual Integrated Assessments of Security Assistance for El Salvador (AIASA), 
important milestones in the reporting of the status of the war, commented without 
any apparent sense of incredulity that military personnel were being turned over to 
judges for various human rights violations. In the AIASA of May 1982, embassy 
staff stated that since October 1979, three hundred ESAF members had been handed 
over to judges.
243
 The following year‟s AIASA noted this number was up to four 
hundred,
244
 suggesting between 1982 and 1983 alone some one hundred military 
personnel had been hauled into courtrooms. This is a remarkably low number, 
especially when one compares this figure with the previously mentioned 25,000 
courts-martial between 1965 and 1969 in Vietnam. 
 
Certification also sustained the sense of rose-tinted optimism. The annual 
certification process for El Salvador, passed into law in 1981, required the U.S. 
administration to keep Congress updated on the status of human rights in the 
country, and represented liberal attempts to force Reagan‟s government to pay 
attention to human rights in return for continuing assistance in the war effort.
245
 The 
Reagan administration treated certification with barely concealed contempt. Deane 
Hinton, who served as Ambassador from 1982 to 1983, derided the process as „close, 
in my view, to being unconstitutional‟ and an attempt by Congress to avoid 
responsibility for making difficult decisions.
246
 The certification reports offer 
conflicting assessments of progress in El Salvador, often sharply critical of elements 
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of Salvadoran society and government but never losing an ability to predict great 
progress in future. The July 1982 certification report highlights the „substantial 
steps‟ taken by the Minister of Defense, General José Guillermo García, in curbing 
problems related to „violations of citizens‟ rights‟ and the „tangible signs of progress‟ 
with regards to the situation in El Salvador.
247
 A year later, in July 1983‟s 
certification report, the embassy again stressed that „senior officers are showing 
greater sensitivity to human rights concerns.‟248 
 
The problem for American officials, and one which some did indeed recognise, was 
that successfully prosecuting human rights violators was impossible in a country in 
which the military had an active stake in the judicial system. A secret Special 
National Intelligence Estimate in January 1983, barely six months after the 
previously noted certification report, commented that any progress in human rights 
was „overshadowed by a virtually non-functional criminal justice system that has 
proved unable to indict and prosecute the accused.‟249 Despite repetitive arguments 
from the United States government that El Salvador was reforming, it was not until 
the conviction of two Army officers in 1991, for the November 1989 murder of six 
Jesuit priests and two women, that guilty ESAF members were successfully brought 
to justice. Even at this late stage in the conflict, with peace negotiations well under 
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way, the judge in charge of the trial was so fearful for his safety that he planned to 
flee the country after announcing the sentence.
250
  
 
Given the derelict state of the justice system in El Salvador, ESAF was comfortable 
with targeting civilians and non-combatants. In an enlightening account of his 
meeting with Defense Minister García, Ambassador Hinton noted García‟s unease 
with the idea of discipline, something that even Hinton sympathised with as possibly 
being „misunderstood and resented‟ by soldiers only trying to do their job.251 The 
ambassador in El Salvador had overall command of the American effort,
252
 and if 
this top United States official was privately communicating his discomfort with strict 
disciplinary measures for ESAF, it is of little surprise that the Salvadoran military 
did not take American efforts to curb human rights abuses seriously. This was not 
only evident in these diplomatic exchanges regarding ESAF‟s military campaign, but 
was also noted in Woerner‟s reluctance to overtly sanction a pacification campaign 
that would have altered the status quo in El Salvador and negated leftist concerns and 
demands. Though the American forces advising Salvadoran troops were keen to shift 
the tactical nature of operations away from a predominantly defensive philosophy, 
there was little dispute over the objective: the destruction of the guerrilla forces. As 
in Vietnam, the U.S. Army in El Salvador sought a militarised solution, with 
Woerner dismissive of population security and pacification programs. Arguing that 
„population control measures in and of themselves will not deny the insurgent the 
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freedom of movement and relative assurance of non-detection‟,253 he considered 
only those programs that are „absolutely necessary and supported by psychological 
operation themes‟ as being worthy of execution.254 
 
This reflected the U.S. Army‟s utterly conventional approach to countering 
insurgency, which between 1960 and the mid-1980s was the thread that weaved its 
way from Vietnam to El Salvador. The U.S. and the Salvadoran armies sought to 
destroy guerrillas as an enemy combatant force, utilising their modern and excessive 
firepower in ever more indiscriminate ways in a vain effort to kill the insurgents in 
the field. The tragic consequence of this approach was that atrocity became much 
more likely. For the U.S. Army in Vietnam, its attritional strategy provided the 
incentive for a lack of restraint when planning and executing combat operations, and 
the concurrent dynamics of ineffective military justice, unit disintegration and often 
ineffective command elements created an excess of pressure that erupted at various 
locations in short sharp outpourings of violence. My Lai was the culmination of 
these pressures, but as Sheehan pointed out, „had they (Task Force Barker) killed just 
as many over a larger area in a longer period of time and killed impersonally with 
bombs, shells, rockets, white phosphorus, and napalm, they would have been 
following the normal pattern of American military behaviour.‟255 Such behaviour 
was not ordered by the U.S. Army, nor was it universal amongst American forces in 
the country. However, it was tolerated and it was the natural result of Army doctrine 
and the combat environment of Vietnam.  
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In El Salvador, a military already predisposed to violence and convention was given 
further encouragement by the United States‟ insistence on a largely militaristic 
solution to the insurgency. Supplying ESAF with conventional weapons systems, 
and huge quantities of ammunition, meant that the United States was promoting a 
form of warfare that was little different from Vietnam a decade earlier. 
Unfortunately, such materiel and doctrinal support merely added fuel to the existing 
fire of ESAF‟s brutal, unprofessional attitude to conducting warfare. A product of 
history, culture and necessity, ESAF‟s combat operations targeted civilians in 
deliberate campaigns of massacre. Unable and unwilling to change its tactics, despite 
American pressure and protestations over the weaknesses of military solutions to 
counterinsurgency,
256
 ESAF maintained a repressive, brutal policy of slaughter in its 
attempts to defeat the FMLN. 
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Chapter 4: Leading to Massacre 
 
„Someone who had not studied the matter would underestimate the influence of 
leadership in enabling killing on the battlefield, but those who have been there know 
better.‟257 - Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman. 
 
Osiel argued that ineffective control over troops often leads to war crimes.
258
 
Therefore, any understanding of the path to My Lai, El Mozote and other atrocities 
of the Vietnam and Salvadoran wars must take into account the actions of those in 
charge of the units who committed these murders. From the very top military leaders 
right down to the squad and platoon commanders on the ground, command 
deficiencies represented an important stage in the build up to atrocity. This chapter 
will study the weaknesses that infected the American and Salvadoran officer corps, 
arguing that careerism, indiscipline, an unerring devotion to convention and even 
corruption resulted in a leadership element that was often unsuited to commanding 
men in the difficult counterinsurgency environment of Vietnam and El Salvador. 
 
Cincinnatus, the anonymous veteran who penned a scathing critique of the American 
military effort in Vietnam, believed the military‟s leaders were of a „shockingly low 
calibre‟ during the conflict.259 This disintegration of the officer corps allowed 
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dangerous precedents to go unchecked.
260
 Indiscipline, unit disintegration and 
indiscriminate combat operations began to take hold. This was particularly 
noticeable in the unwillingness of many leaders to display ethical fortitude in the 
face of the military‟s unyielding focus on indiscriminate attrition. Partially this was 
the result of the Army‟s institutional shift to a more bureaucratised, market-
orientated philosophy, and partly it was a result of personal failures by officers. This 
study has highlighted the importance of statistical data as a means of conducting the 
war in Vietnam, and how that fed into the cycle of violence. The officer corps 
represented the primary conduit through which this notion passed to the soldiers on 
the ground. They too were affected by this statistical, business-orientated approach 
to the conflict, although in far greater ways than the average GI.  
 
For a start, officers found themselves under intense pressure to demonstrate qualities 
that were more akin to office management than command leadership, especially after 
the appointment of Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense in 1960. Officers 
began to see a division between their role as a professional in the military, and the 
job of managing their unit: in McNamara‟s Army, as officers were gradually 
required to choose between these two roles, those who opted for the former were 
frequently set back in their military career.
261
 What emerged, as a result, was an 
officer corps increasingly modelled upon a business. This excessive focus on the 
career and on the individual relegated military ethics to a secondary place behind the 
desire to forge ahead and progress up the ladder of opportunity. 
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Playing the game in Vietnam required adherence to the statistical criteria of winning 
the war, as highlighted in the previous chapter. It was argued that mathematical 
methodologies, such as body counts and contact ratios, fed a soldier‟s impulse to fire 
first and ask questions later. For those in charge of these soldiers, similar forces were 
at work. Indeed, it was the pressure placed upon officers to demonstrate a 
commitment to this approach to war, and the willingness demonstrated by the officer 
corps to follow this ideology, that helped create and sustain the immense pressure for 
the GI on the ground. Officers demonstrated what Gabriel termed a „pervasive sense 
of ethical relativism‟ in conducting the war, primarily as a result of concern for their 
own careers.
262
 Required to show adherence to the Army concept, to the unyielding 
desire for increasing kill counts, officers took that to mean standards of warfare were 
to be sacrificed for the greater goal. 
 
The previously discussed 9
th
 Infantry Division is a useful example of this attitude. 
Not only did Ewell personally regard this approach as a tactical necessity, his 
command also demonstrated an attitude to the careers of his subordinate 
commanders that displayed the links between statistics, careerism and combat 
command. Responding to Ewell‟s comment that Viet Cong deaths were becoming 
harder to obtain, his assistant division commander replied that „brigade commanders 
aren‟t‟, and his junior officers‟ careers were threatened if they did not meet the kill 
quotas he demanded.
 263
 The result of such pressure was the banishment of ethics as 
a restraint on operations, with commanders in the 9
th
 Infantry killing a large number 
of civilians in the course of their operations, as well as risking the lives of American 
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troops in the constant quest to make sure their careers were not derailed through lack 
of commitment to the cause.
264
 Such commitment also required the creation of 
detailed reports on the outcome of an officer‟s operations and his performance in the 
field of duty. The reports were absolutely vital to an officer‟s career.265 It was 
common knowledge that a single less-than-perfect report could irreparably damage 
the career of a young officer.
266
 Consequently, leaders were far more concerned with 
reporting the perfect nature of their unit, and its conduct, than in actually monitoring 
their force and confronting any issues that might arise. Gabriel points out that such 
concealment amounted „at times to the point of criminal behaviour.‟267 
 
Such an analysis was reflected in the Peers Report‟s conclusion that „a dangerously 
permissive attitude toward the handling and safeguarding of Vietnamese and their 
property existed within elements of the 11
th
 Brigade chain of command prior to the 
Son My operation.‟268 Furthermore, it is clear from the testimony of those involved 
in Task Force Barker that a number of the command elements of the force were more 
than happy to let indiscipline infect the unit – for example, with the execution of 
prisoners.
269
 The officer corps was the primary means of imposing discipline and 
was the first barrier to atrocities driven from below.
270
 If My Lai is considered as a 
result of Task Force Barker‟s personal desires, for example revenge or aggression, 
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then the officers‟ permissive approach to the unit was of absolutely crucial 
importance in understanding how the massacre could have occurred. 
 
For officers, therefore, the Army during Vietnam offered little incentive to enforce 
strict discipline within units, nor to play it safe in combat. Nevertheless, command 
deficiency within the US Army during Vietnam was not simply a product of 
individual conduct. Powerful institutional factors, which no single officer could hope 
to resist, also had tremendous importance in creating a dangerously command-
deficient environment during the war. One of the most fundamental was the Army‟s 
insistence on six month tours for its officers. Such tours, whilst providing the 
maximum number of officers with combat experience, were an utter disaster for the 
cohesion and combat effectiveness of the service. Officers were rotated away from 
their soldiers just as they had developed experience of the conflict and a measure of 
respect and trust from the GIs.
271
 Institutional memory within the Army in Vietnam 
was almost non-existent, and created a force that Sheehan considered to be geared 
towards the „unlearning rather than the learning of lessons.‟272 Lacking a coherent, 
sustained experience, rooted in a stable, durable officer corps, the Army struggled in 
terms of tactics and strategy. Such a struggle undermined performance. Poor 
performance led to frustration, and frustration helped lead to atrocity, when soldiers, 
tired of endlessly being ambushed and firing at shadows released their pent up anger 
on definite, albeit, civilian targets. 
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In El Salvador, where so much of the line between politics and the military was often 
blurred, even non-existent, the importance of the officer corps in the conduct of the 
violence directed against the left also was of crucial importance. An examination of 
the officer corps of ESAF leads to the conclusion that its fractious nature, inward-
looking philosophy, and own self interests, led to an attitude of brutality and 
repression towards those who it regarded as opposition. It is abundantly clear that 
specific individuals within the officer corps were at the very forefront of the 
repression and brutality that defined the war. Roberto D‟Aubuisson, who 
consistently confounded his domestic opponents and the best efforts of the American 
diplomatic corps to reduce his importance, led the way. American officials were in 
no doubt as to the role he played in the violence within El Salvador, as evidenced by 
a CIA National Foreign Assessment Centre briefing for Vice President George Bush 
in March 1981, in which D‟Aubuisson‟s role as the „principal henchman‟ of rich 
landowners was highlighted.
273
 Robert E. White, the American Ambassador to El 
Salvador from March 1980 to February 1981, went as far as to denounce 
D‟Aubuisson as a „pathological killer.‟274 D‟Aubuisson was the protégé of José 
Alberto „Chele‟ Medrano who, as the first commanding officer of the Salvadoran 
National Special Services Agency (ANSESAL), had been instrumental in the 
foundation of the Democratic Nationalist Organisation (ORDEN). ORDEN, meaning 
„order‟, was at the very heart of the repressive security apparatus that spread the 
violence throughout El Salvador from the 1960s onwards. 
 
                                                 
273
 „El Salvador: The Right Wing‟, Classification Excised, Intelligence Memorandum, 18 March 1981. 
274
 New York Times, 19 February 1982. 
92 
 
Interestingly, Medrano, who was on the CIA payroll during this period, had been 
sent to Vietnam on a three month tour of American operations during the war 
there.
275
 This trip took place during what McClintock regards as one of the most 
important stages of the development of El Salvador‟s repressive security apparatus: a 
period commencing from 1960 in which US military policies were, for the first time, 
integrated into El Salvador‟s security programs.276 These were directed mainly at the 
creation of paramilitary forces, such as ORDEN, rather than at the ESAF. Thus, 
Medrano‟s time in Vietnam does not necessarily seem to have a correlation with the 
warfare adopted by the Salvadorans in their own fight against insurgents. In fact, it 
appears to have been a remarkably contrary approach. Rather than taking lessons 
from the US Army‟s massed firepower approach to the matter, Medrano adopted a 
program of grass-roots paramilitary force. In any case, Medrano‟s journey to 
Vietnam would likely have demonstrated to him just how focused the U.S. was on 
countering communist insurgencies around the world, and he would no doubt have 
found a new, more globalised interpretation of his own anti-communism to take back 
to El Salvador. 
 
Medrano‟s 1972 political campaign was assisted by a number of officers who would 
later go on to be intimately involved with the violence directed at civilians. Not only 
did D‟Aubuisson aid the campaign, but Domingo Monterrosa offered his services. 
Monterrosa, as commanding officer of the Atlacatl Battalion during the 1980s, 
would lead this unit though a string of barbaric operations, including El Mozote. He 
was the epitome of the Salvadoran military‟s officer corps in terms of its strategic 
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understanding of the war. Questioned by reporters following a ten day sweep 
through Chalatenango department in 1982, Monterrosa summed up the officer corps‟ 
point of view on the nature of the combat when he acknowledged that it was „natural 
that there were a series of people killed, some without weapons, including some 
women, and I understand some children.‟277 Monterrosa was particularly stringent on 
his unit‟s willingness to kill children, arguing a year later that „once you have seen 
several 12-year olds in action, you can no longer dismiss the possibility that any 12 
year old may be a guerrilla.‟278 
 
These officers, however, were not unique. Their actions were mirrored by many of 
their colleagues, with varying degrees of intensity, and were shaped by a variety of 
historical and cultural precedents that often took on a much greater resonance than 
any US influence gleaned during officer training courses at US military installations 
and academies. Indeed, the Salvadoran officer clique is testament to the inability of 
American advisors and diplomats to impart extensive influence on Salvadoran 
military policy. As a strongly conservative organisation,
279
 ESAF‟s officer corps was 
at the very heart of the violence that was directed at civilians during, and prior to, the 
civil war. Anti-communist zeal had been enshrined within the institution for decades, 
and the corps regarded itself as the last bastion against communists, reformists and 
other opposition forces. Indeed, the creed of the corps neatly encapsulated this self-
aggrandisement - „the Republic shall live as long as the Army shall live.‟280 Over the 
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course of many years this intoxicating sense of national worth had been burned into 
the minds of officer recruits and, though an increasingly reformist cabal of junior 
officers began to emerge in the late 1970s, the overwhelming majority in combat 
commands and important, influential government positions were of the hard-line, 
conservative variety. 
 
As noted in the previous chapters, fears for the future of the armed forces as an 
institution fed the violence that wracked El Salvador. It was the officer corps, being 
the most heavily invested in the organisation, which led the defence of the military 
through brutality directed against opponents. General José Guillermo García, 
Minister of Defense from the coup in 1979 to 1984, proclaimed that the reformists‟ 
goal was „the destruction of the armed forces‟ and declared his mission was „to 
defend the armed institution in order to avoid its collapse.‟281 García‟s successor, 
General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova similarly believed his mission was to „save 
this country and our own institution – the Army.‟282  
 
These comments reveal the self-serving, paranoid atmosphere that pervaded the 
officer corps. Given the seniority of these members of ESAF, it can be argued that 
the violence directed at civilians as a means of protecting the officer corps and the 
military as a whole was a top-down process, emanating and gaining credibility from 
the very upper echelons of the officer corps. Conservative officers saw opponents 
everywhere in society,
283
 and an attitude of defiance, of bravely countering 
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reformists and communists at every turn, gave officers the justification for the 
violence they unleashed upon the civilian population. 
 
This argument suggests a classical interpretation of the violence, resting on the 
political science theory that repression was codified around a functionalist response 
by the military to its own safety, and by default, that of the country too. Such an 
analysis has been queried by recent studies of El Salvador which seek a more 
comprehensive examination of the roots of the state violence.
284
 Stanley argued that 
such functionalist explanations, resting on modernisation theory, are insufficient in 
explaining the violence, and that only by examining the multitude of relationships 
between state actors, elites, economies and institutions can a more balanced 
interpretation of state violence be developed.
285
 Nevertheless, it is important not to 
underestimate the impact of the officer corps‟ own insecurity and its role in creating 
great impetus for extreme violence. 
 
A classic instrumentalist response to a security threat does not wholly explain away 
the violence. The links between officers and the violence of the military campaign 
were the product of a number of additional factors, all of which contributed to the 
brutality of repression. For decades, the officer corps had utilised a military academy 
based extensively on an annual class system.
286
 At the Capitán General Gerardo 
Barrios military academy, each year‟s intake would develop close personal ties; 
relationships that were incredibly powerful, durable and influential. An officer‟s 
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annual class – his tanda – became the most powerful influence over his actions in his 
future military career. Each tanda produced a sense of loyalty that was of such stern 
durability that an officer would not contemplate the thought of denouncing another 
classmate for abusing his command position, or for negligible oversight of a military 
operation in the field. The Woerner Report noted that such loyalty was so intense 
that it possibly exceeded an officer‟s anti-communist zeal, and indeed, his patriotic 
concern for El Salvador.
287
  
 
This notion of loyalty to one‟s classmates, rather than to a grander notion of the 
state, allowed a wildly permissive attitude towards the application of violence. 
Imbued with a sense of unaccountability, officers considered themselves beyond the 
law. Bosch dates this system back to the Spanish conquistadors. In his opinion, the 
sense of entitlement that characterised the behaviour of the officer corps was a 
product of the fuero military: the Spanish monarchs‟ authorisation allowing the 
military to exist in a state beyond the criminal and civil courts of the time.
288
 Just as 
the Matanza influenced contemporary Salvadoran tactics, so too did this earlier 
precedent have an impact centuries later in the 1970s and 1980s. The lack of judicial 
overview of Army strategy, noted in the previous chapter, was testament to this. 
Seeking to prosecute a fellow member of the officer corps, or even accusing a 
comrade of negative actions, was simply unthinkable for an officer corps predicated 
on the basis of loyalty to the institution above all else. 
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The tanda system also had an incredibly destabilising effect on the governance of El 
Salvador and produced a succession of coups and fractious juntas. Tandas were 
central to the organisation of the coups and conspiracies that plagued the Salvadoran 
political landscape as the 1970s drew to a close. Declassified U.S. embassy cables 
concerning the possibility of coups in the late 1970s show the importance of the 
tanda as a basis for action in El Salvador. A 5 June 1979 secret cable commented on 
the latest coup developments revolving around „informal conversation between 
several majors in the 1963 military class.‟289 The 1963 tanda was a particularly 
powerful influence within ESAF, a fact not lost on the embassy, which specifically 
mentioned this tanda in an analysis of the political situation in the aftermath of the 
1979 coup.
290
 With a membership roster that included some of the most notorious 
officers of the period, including Roberto D‟Aubuisson, the escalation of violence in 
the country as this group increased its influence on the political landscape cannot be 
seen as mere coincidence. 
 
Woerner argued that the armed forces had „a degree of resiliency made possible by 
its [ESAF‟s] remarkable institutional cohesion.‟291 This analysis was a deep 
misunderstanding of the reality of the situation. The officer corps, though sharing 
many of the same goals, was deeply divided over the conduct of the war against the 
insurgents, and conservative elements of the corps would utilise their alliances to 
marginalise those officers who favoured reform, and promote a sweeping repression. 
Over the twentieth-century, a labyrinthine political structure created a bizarre system 
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of command that revolved around the tandas, anti-incentives and Machiavellian 
manoeuvrings.
292
 The primary example of this was the way in which command 
positions were allocated. More powerful officers centred their operations and 
networking on San Salvador, strengthening their position through the execution of 
politically powerful posts, usually in Intelligence. The least competent officers, or 
those who failed in the politically charged climate of San Salvador, were quickly 
dismissed to the isolation of rural departmental commands. American observers were 
damning in their assessment of the majority of combat commanders, with Colonel 
Waghelstein believing that as of March 1982, when the fight against the insurgents 
was at its most difficult stage, only two out of the fourteen departmental 
commanders were „worth a damn.‟293 In a dark twist, and against all logic, the least 
able became the most important in prosecuting the actual war effort.
294
 
 
The more politically astute officers not only secured their position through the 
marginalisation of weak officers, they also subverted the legitimacy of reformist 
officers by assigning them to dangerous locations. As the 1979 reformist junta began 
to lose power under an onslaught of careful political manoeuvring by hardliners, 
junior officers who advocated tolerance or restraint, or those who were particularly 
stringent in their adherence to human rights regulations, were assigned to combat 
theatres in which repression was the norm. Mena Sandoval, a reformist officer who 
defected to the FMLN in disgust at the Army‟s behaviour, stated that he was 
deployed to a combat command and pressured to commit massacres, whilst Amilcar 
                                                 
292
 Danner, El Mozote, p. 39. 
293
 Interview with Colonel John D. Waghelstein, El Salvador at War, p. 196. 
294
 Danner, El Mozote, p. 39. 
99 
 
Molina Panameño, a leading member of the reformist faction, was transferred into 
the National Police and placed in a notorious death squad unit.
295
 Such actions 
demonstrated the lengths to which conservative elements of the officer corps would 
go to make sure there were no obstructions to their strategy for „saving the country‟. 
Reformists and opponents were faced with the stark choice of giving up or facing 
deployment to a dangerous, rural combat position. Once on assignment, it was highly 
likely that an officer would come into contact with brutality that would tarnish his 
reputation in the unlikely event of any future attempt at reform, and leave him open 
to the kind of prosecution he himself wanted for those guilty of war crimes. 
 
Without a cohesive, unified officer corps, departmental commanders and their 
underlings were free to profit from the violence in more personal ways. Studies of El 
Salvador in the early 1980s note that there was no centralised point of authority 
directing combat commands,
296
 thus officers exercised extensive autonomy. During 
the build up to the civil war, as violence intensified, ESAF officers sought to take 
advantage of their independence by using the fear of violence, and violence itself, in 
order to increase their wealth. Kidnapping and private protection were used by ESAF 
officers as means of garnering huge wealth. Major Guillermo Roeder combined the 
two: invoicing wealthy clients for protection services rendered by his Army unit, he 
would then kidnap these very clients for ransom, thereby securing even greater profit 
from the enterprise.
297
 It is testament to the magnitude of Roeder‟s operation that it 
eventually provoked the anger of the National Police who arrested Roeder in 1982, 
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charging him with utilising his security and protection service to carry out crimes in 
the guise of both leftist and rightist extremists.
298
  
 
In the U.S. embassy‟s opinion, Roeder‟s case was „unique in Salvadoran history‟ 
given his rank and the extent of the charges brought against him.
299
 But in reality 
Roeder‟s case was only unique in the sense that he was brought up on charges. 
According to an embassy cable from San Salvador to the Department of State, 
Salvadoran expatriate oligarchs living in Miami were convinced that other senior 
members of the officer corps were not only knowledgeable about kidnappings and 
associated violence, but were also profiting from it themselves. The embassy‟s 
political officer met with a group of fifteen Salvadoran expatriates in Florida – a 
group characterised as supporters of D‟Aubuisson and the National Republican 
Alliance (ARENA), but who had recently lost faith due to the lack of progress in 
returning El Salvador to its previous „glory‟. These Salvadorans, interestingly, 
directed their ire at the military, and in particular, at „a corrupt and venal clique of 
officers‟ who had authorised and planned the majority of kidnappings in the period 
1972-1981. Though Roeder had been the only one discovered so far, these oligarchs 
claimed even senior figures such as ex-Chief of Staff Carlos Alberto Rodriguez, ex-
ANSESAL director Francisco Moran and even Minister of Defense Guillermo 
Garcia had knowledge of, and had profited from, this campaign of orchestrated 
kidnapping and violence.
300
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Violence and profit were therefore inextricably linked within the workings of the 
Salvadoran officer corps. Far from being a product of isolated „bad apples‟, 
profiteering from the violence of the counterinsurgency campaign was simply part of 
the unprofessionalism that permeated the leadership element of ESAF, all the way to 
the very top of the command chain. Criticism of the officer corps by disgruntled 
expatriates might be seen as a means of gaining some measure of revenge over those 
that the oligarchs regarded as being ineffective in the restoration of the status quo. 
However, it was this group of wealthy businessmen who had some of the most 
detailed knowledge of just how unprofessional the officer corps was. An 
examination of U.S. cable traffic from the embassy in San Salvador to the 
government in Washington D.C reveals a handful of documents outlining 
conversations held between political staff from the embassy and Salvadoran 
oligarchs, all of which highlight in some detail links between the officer corps and 
this wealthy community sitting out the war abroad, mostly in Miami. 
 
This is one reason why Stanley defined the country, in the title of his major work, as 
The Protection Racket State. Examples of personal gain fuelling the bloodshed were 
all too common, and reflected the long interaction between the economic elites of the 
nation, and the officer corps. Stanley argues persuasively that ESAF, led by its 
officer element, believed it merited the right to lead the nation and profit from this 
leadership, in return for deploying its military might against those who threatened 
the small group of economic elites who had accrued vast wealth from the agrarian 
system.
301
 As such, when the FMLN began to call for moderation and a system of 
agricultural and political reform which threatened this status quo, ESAF was quick to 
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employ its resources in deliberate campaigns against those who might support such a 
cause. 
 
During the 1980s, some of these campaigns of violence and brutality were financed 
by a cabal of wealthy Salvadoran expatriates. Residing in Miami, these conservative 
elites provided financial support and organisational direction to right-wing death 
squads in an attempt to terrorise the business community remaining in El Salvador 
into opposing the reformist junta of 1979. Provided with explicit details on this 
„Millionaires Murder Inc.‟ in January 1981, the U.S. embassy in San Salvador was 
dismayed to find that the brutality of the Salvadoran war had direct links to the 
mainland United States.
302
 Their informant, „a highly respected Salvadoran lawyer‟ 
who was known, and well regarded, by the American diplomatic presence in El 
Salvador, notified the embassy that this group of six Salvadoran millionaires had not 
only targeted the Salvadoran business community, but had probably orchestrated the 
murder of two American citizens, employees of the American Institute for Free 
Labor Development, who had been gunned down in the Sheraton Hotel in San 
Salvador on 3 January 1981.
303
 This information was later supported by a security 
force member who, in a conversation with the embassy‟s political officer, confirmed 
that a Miami resident had provided 100,000 colones of funding for the hit.
304
 
 
The 6 January 1981 cable cited above is one of the most important documents to 
illuminate the links between Salvadoran oligarchs, the officer corps, illegal death 
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squads and the brutality sweeping the country at the onset of the 1980s. The level of 
detail within the document suggests that the source was indeed knowledgeable about 
the workings of the so-called Miami Six, and that the embassy was convinced of the 
veracity of the accusations. The embassy was particularly concerned with the links 
between the millionaires and Roberto D‟Aubuisson who, as the millionaires‟ agent 
in El Salvador, directly orchestrated the violence on behalf of the wealthy. Their goal 
was simple, and neatly encapsulated the intra-Salvadoran dynamics that created and 
maintained the violence of the war. In the oligarchs‟ opinion, a limpeza, or 
„cleansing‟, was to occur, and with these hundreds of thousands of deaths a pro-
oligarchic state would be reconstituted in the country. 
 
Crucially, the message points out the toxic relationship between private interests and 
the officer corps. The Miami-based Salvadorans were bribing officers to carry out 
the violence necessary to cleanse the country of threats to their business life.
305
 With 
D‟Aubuisson as their agent, they were utilising the officer corps in order to 
maximise their ability to direct the violence.  It is worth noting the utter dismay the 
embassy felt upon hearing corroboration of accusations they had previously 
communicated to the Department of State. In a scathingly critical closing remark the 
cable notes that, over the last ten months, a number of American officials had 
knowledge of this operation. It was, in the eyes of the embassy, 
 
„unacceptable that such an operation is guided from a major American city and 
that nothing can be done to stop it before another American official or contract 
employee is murdered here. We are unaware of any steps to investigate the 
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information on this operation that has been provided by the embassy in the past. 
We believe steps must be taken immediately to get to the bottom of these 
charges and that, if proven, the guilty should be prosecuted to the limits of U.S. 
law.‟306 
 
Such vehement criticism of its own government demonstrates a second argument 
relevant to the overall discussion. Far from being a unified effort from the embassy, 
the Department of State in Washington and the military component of American 
assistance, US policy in El Salvador was subject to incredibly diverse dynamics 
which often pushed and pulled in many directions, usually to the detriment of human 
rights policy. In this case, it is clear that the embassy regarded progress in curbing 
the violence as being hampered by other sections of the foreign policy apparatus. 
The subsequent investigation by the Department of Justice was marred by inaction 
and disinterest,
307
 suggesting that higher powers in Washington were less than keen 
to enquire into the matter and seek the charges and prosecutions that the embassy in 
El Salvador demanded. This certainly backs up the claim made by Ambassador 
White that prior to Reagan‟s inauguration, a „transition team‟ visited the country in 
order to make clear that human rights were about to become a secondary issue to the 
overall objective of defeating the insurgency.
308
 
 
Close relationships between oligarchs and officers were not unusual in El Salvador. 
In fact, the expansion of ORDEN was linked with the agrarian elite. Medrano and 
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then President Fidel Sánchez Hernández had deliberately appealed to the nation‟s 
wealthy farming families to finance the escalation in ORDEN‟s capabilities.309 The 
oligarchs escalated this involvement in the violence during the latter 1970s. The 
elites had sought in the last few years of the 1970s a means of actively directing 
combat troops against their foes. Their solution was to engage with the junior officer 
corps, bribing these men with lucrative, albeit shady, employment opportunities. In 
doing so, they sought to garner influence, and develop relationships, with those 
soldiers who would actually command combat troops in the field in subsequent 
years.
310
 
 
By the time the civil war erupted, a number of combat leaders had close ties to the 
elite segment of Salvadoran society, and utilised their command positions to engage 
in brutal operations targeting opponents and reforms. For example, Colonel Sigfrido 
Ochoa, a close associate of D‟Aubuisson and the extreme right in the country, was 
particularly well known as an opponent of land reform, and actively obstructed its 
implementation.
311
 In another case, a massacre in Sonsonate province in February 
1983 was linked to a dispute between a farm holder and peasant workers from a 
neighbouring farm. The farmer notified the local battalion commander who 
personally directed his own troops to round up eighteen of the peasants, 
subsequently executing them with their hands tied.
312
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Therefore, the role of the officer corps in targeting violence at opponents of the 
regime in El Salvador was not merely based upon their own stringent anti-
communism, or even on a purely military doctrine. Close ties to the economic elites 
of the country had created an officer corps that gained wealth and power from 
safeguarding the interests of these very elites. Stanley, having interviewed a number 
of US Military Group and Salvadoran officers from the period, noted the perception 
amongst some of these American officers that the Salvadoran officer corps was so 
wedded to this ability to garner wealth from the violence that they were deliberately 
seeking to maintain a state of war.
313
  
 
Such analysis was, unfortunately, lacking from the majority of American officials 
who had contact with the Salvadoran officer corps. Over the period, Salvadoran 
officers were able, in Stanley‟s words, to „manipulate, sweet-talk, mislead, and 
betray their U.S patrons with panache and impunity‟.314 It was the senior officers in 
ESAF who had the most success here, and their deceit and manipulation of American 
officials was a crucial component in not only allowing the violence to continue, but 
to escalate as well. 
 
In truth, American diplomatic staff and military personnel were more than willing to 
overlook the officer corps‟ actions. Unwilling to put pressure on their allies in the 
fight against communism, American staff consistently maintained faultless optimism 
in public, and when doubts emerged in private they failed to act decisively. 
Ambassador after ambassador interacted with the senior officer corps yet failed to 
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achieve any meaningful action on human rights violations. Certainly the Reagan 
administration was less inclined to move against the officers, going as far as to 
remove its own embassy staff in an effort to halt criticism of ESAF‟s leaders.315 
However even more liberal embassy officials under Carter, such as Ambassador 
Robert White, were ineffective in halting the murderous campaign of the officer 
corps. 
 
Even the deaths of American citizens, as at the Sheraton or the churchwomen raped 
and murdered in December 1980, did not affect the willingness of U.S. officials to 
work with the officer corps. American officials suspected the military had, at the 
very least, covered up the case of the churchwomen,
316
 but the U.S. was unwilling to 
jettison the officer corps or allow the military to disintegrate. Even damning 
assessments of officers themselves did not reduce American assistance. D‟Aubuisson 
was recognised by American intelligence officials as „egocentric and reckless‟,317 
whilst García was seen as remarkably duplicitous by Ambassador Deane Hinton.
318
 
However, combat officers who demonstrated aggression in the field were praised 
profusely by U.S. military and diplomatic officials, notwithstanding that these 
officers were commanding units that often had appalling human rights records. 
Monterrosa was „a hotshot strategist‟ in the eyes of Colonel John Cash, the US 
military attaché, and a man who Cash would „put up against any American 
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hotshot.‟319 Ochoa was also highly regarded by American advisors, who saw him as 
a commander in their mould.
320
 The actions of the Atlacatl under Monterrosa and 
Ochoa‟s links to D‟Aubuisson‟s brutality did not seem to have much of an effect on 
the American opinion in the country. 
 
Secure in the knowledge that their American patrons were willing to look the other 
way, the Salvadoran officer corps carried out murder and massacre as national 
policy. Their role in determining this policy was absolute, for without a functioning 
NCO element to the military, operations were personally directed by senior officers. 
This complete lack of effective NCO leadership was a significant problem for 
American officials, who believed an effective NCO corps could help professionalise 
the military and redress the imbalance in the relationship between soldiers and their 
leaders which produced critical problems in the effectiveness of the armed forces.
321
 
Crucially, without a proper NCO corps, senior officers could take advantage of the 
situation and enforce their whims on enlisted troops who, through tradition and 
training, were beholden to the wishes of their senior commanders. 
 
After a fact-finding trip to the country in July 1981, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs, Francis J. West, noted the important 
socio-cultural determinants behind the military‟s reluctance to create and maintain a 
functional Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) group. Noting the class distinction 
that existed in the armed forces, West asserted that „the officer expects the soldier to 
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give complete obedience and to show zero initiative; the soldier expects the officer 
to make all the decisions and to take care of him.‟ 322 
 
This class prejudice certainly could have played a role. The majority of enlisted men 
were from the poorer element of Salvadoran society, whereas officers tended to join 
the institution from the middle class.
323
 Given the historical animosity between these 
two sectors of society, officers often adopted harsh attitudes toward their men. 
American advisors considered the treatment of enlisted men by their officers as 
extremely poor.
324
 However, perhaps more importantly, NCO‟s were viewed with 
suspicion by officers because of the interference they would have in the direction of 
operations. As the Woerner Report noted, a professional NCO corps was against „the 
traditional leadership attitudes, institutional norms, and operational procedures of the 
Armed Force.‟325 This was apparent at El Mozote, where a number of higher echelon 
officers were involved on the ground during the course of the operation. It would 
seem, judging by the testimony of one of the few survivors of the massacre, Rufina 
Amaya, that the course of the massacre was altered following the arrival, and 
departure, of senior officers who visited the site during the day. It was only after the 
visit of senior leaders that the killings began.
326
 
 
This highlights the chaos of El Salvador‟s war. In some cases, combat operations 
were directly orchestrated on the scene by conservative hardliners. These 
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conservative leaders had the closest ties to the economic elites and the firebrand 
officials who employed Cold War rhetoric in their exhortations against the 
insurgents. In other cases, however, the relegation of tactically ineffective, and 
politically weak, rivals to combat commands meant some operations were executed 
with a level of incompetence that created grave danger for civilians caught in the line 
of fire. In both cases, the marginalisation of reformist officers allowed no limitations 
on the behaviour of troops in the field. 
 
The officer corps of both the U.S. Army in Vietnam and ESAF in El Salvador‟s civil 
war must take a great deal of the responsibility for the actions of their troops in 
committing massacre and murder. In each case a tainted sense of professionalism led 
to a willingness to tolerate, promote and demand tactics that placed civilians in the 
firing line. In Vietnam, the U.S. Army suffered from its own extreme careerism. In 
placing an officer‟s managerial qualities above combat determinants the Army added 
additional momentum to the damaging statistical approach to warfare that was 
already being waged. In denying officers a chance to gain long term exposure to the 
problems of the war by recalling them from combat commands after six months, the 
Army created patchwork units whose tactical knowledge was diluted every time an 
officer left. In certain units, like the Americal and Tiger Force, officers were 
explicitly to blame for failing to adequately enforce discipline and professionalism. 
The Peers Report argued that „the need for professional leadership, mature 
judgement, sound analytical decisions, and effective control of combat actions was 
clearly evident‟ with regards to warfare in Vietnam,327 but it is equally as clear that 
often these requirements were entirely lacking. 
                                                 
327
 Peers Report, p. 9-22. 
111 
 
 
In El Salvador, the leadership component of ESAF presented a dichotomy. In one 
sense it had a staggeringly inflated sense of its own professional status. By placing 
the survival of the institution above the security of the nation, and certainly well 
above the safety of the population, ESAF‟s officer corps regarded the violence they 
unleashed on civilians as justified. However, leaders within ESAF, both combat and 
non-combat, also embodied a remarkable level of unprofessionalism. Through 
convention, ESAF‟s officers had come to occupy an elite position with El Salvador‟s 
polarised society. Ideological links between conservatism and the officer corps were 
deeply entrenched, and made explicit in the lucrative financial relationships between 
many hard-line officers and Salvadoran businessmen, land owners and those with an 
interest in preserving the status quo. Consequently, in utilising their combat forces 
for the personal gain of others, as well as for their own, officers took on a huge 
degree of responsibility for the slaughter that was inflicted upon civilians who 
represented a threat to El Salvador‟s capitalist-military state.  
 
Officers in Vietnam and El Salvador had the responsibility to oversee combat 
operations in an incredibly difficult, dangerous combat environment. Many of them 
failed to do this adequately, creating an environment in which massacre was more 
likely to occur and in which civilian deaths could often be subsumed into the general 
level of violence attained in prosecuting the war. In some cases, officers actively 
sought the destruction of civilian communities. Though Vietnam had few recorded 
cases of such activity, it is clear that the actions of the Americal and Tiger Force 
were greatly dependent on orders received by commanding officers. In El Salvador, 
murder and massacre was often orchestrated at the behest of officers, or in some 
112 
 
cases, by utilising officers as proxies between combat units and oligarchic hardliners. 
In all cases, soldiers within the military establishment, with its emphasis on loyalty, 
decisiveness and obedience, found their limitations against atrocity reduced as a 
result of their officers‟ command deficiencies. 
 
 
„Never underestimate the power of the need to obey.‟328 
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Chapter 5: Face to Face with Atrocity 
 
„You kill a gook, there was nothing to it.‟ 329 – Anonymous Vietnam veteran. 
 
The soldiers who killed civilians in Vietnam and El Salvador were the product of 
their environment in many respects. As we have seen, the training they underwent, 
the conduct of the wars in which they fought, and the leadership they served under 
were all powerful factors in their journey towards atrocity. Yet their actions in 
slaughtering civilians were not only derived from external factors: soldiers were also 
influenced by the emotional turbulence of warfare. Their reaction to the immediate 
environment into which they were placed on operations, in addition to their response 
to cultural and social dynamics playing out around them, contributed greatly to the 
way they interacted with civilians. This final chapter will examine the relationship 
between civilians and soldiers in Vietnam and El Salvador, asking how behavioural, 
cultural, geographic and historical processes produced such a schism between 
civilians and soldiers. 
 
It is a remarkable fact that so many of the personal motivations involved in the 
slaughter of civilians in Vietnam and El Salvador were shared by soldiers from each 
war. The interaction between civilians and soldiers in each conflict was characterised 
in many cases by maltreatment, abuse and unrestrained violence by soldiers. Those 
who murdered at My Lai or at El Mozote shared a similar low opinion of civilians in 
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these communities. This disregard for civilian life was the common denominator that 
tied together all those who murdered civilians, be it in Vietnam or El Salvador. 
 
Civilians were one of the most important variables in both wars. In Vietnam, the 
indigenous population affected every facet of the war for American soldiers.
330
 Not 
only were American combat operations frequently mounted within Vietnamese 
communities, but civilians were also a supply of cheap and plentiful labour for 
American forces in the country, and were to be found in vast numbers at military 
bases throughout the country. At Chu Lai, for example, hundreds, possibly 
thousands, of native Vietnamese worked to maintain the smooth running of the 
Marine Corps facility.
331
 Thus, not only did American soldiers interact with the 
Vietnamese on their combat operations, but they were also dealing with them on 
their „down-time‟ at supposedly secure posts. In El Salvador, civilians were also an 
integral aspect of the conflict. Though not required to provide the kind of logistical 
support as in Vietnam, the population interacted frequently with ESAF units. 
Combat operations were often executed in the vicinity of communities, and regional 
garrisons – cuartels – were placed in rural towns. Consequently, civilians were a 
common sight for troops, with ESAF patrols moving through communities as part of 
their anti-guerrilla sweeps.
332
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With civilians an ever-present factor, it was incumbent upon the leadership of both 
the American military in Vietnam and ESAF in their own country to educate their 
troops as to the appropriate means of behaving around civilians. Though this might 
have been achieved through the correct instruction in human rights legislation, it 
should also have been based greatly around an appreciation of cultural and social 
norms in the communities within which military forces operated during the two 
conflicts. In both cases, soldiers received little to no education in the ways of the 
population they were supposed to be defending. 
 
Vietnam represented a culture shock for American troops. Soldiers came into contact 
with a society almost entirely opposite to their experience of life back in the United 
States. They were amazed at the apparent poverty and squalor of the Vietnamese 
population, and instinctively compared the nature of society in this new world to the 
culture of their homeland.
333
 Though surprise was natural, ignorance contributed 
greatly, and those with a more worldly view were deeply critical of their comrades 
who adopted westernised superiority in their opinion of Vietnam and its 
population.
334
 
 
Bergerud has claimed that Vietnam was one of the only wars in American history in 
which U.S. soldiers were not adequately informed about their allies.
335
  In reality, 
Vietnam represented the continuation of a pattern of ignorance. Though American 
servicemen based in England during World War II, for example, were given an 
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excellent and rigorous education in local customs,
336
 U.S. military efforts in the past 
had suffered from a poor understanding of indigenous peoples.
337
 This continued in 
Vietnam, despite the additional complexities of conducting actual combat operations 
within local communities and the linguistic barriers between Americans and 
Vietnamese. 
 
Even the Army‟s advisor program suffered from a startling failure to educate its 
members sufficiently before they were sent to Vietnam. These advisors, who 
represented the marginalised pacification component of American strategy in 
Vietnam, had particularly frequent contact with the Vietnamese. Yet the language 
training provided by the Army was too brief for a language as complex and nuanced 
as Vietnamese.
338
 It left soldiers relying on interpreters, and the single year tour of 
duty for advisors provided little opportunity for these troops to learn in-country.
339
 
Ramsey summarised the advisor orientation program as, at best, creating a 
perfunctory knowledge of cultural differences.
340
 It offered no assistance in bridging 
the gulf between the two vastly different societies. 
 
If advisors were inadequately prepared for the cultural shock of Vietnam, what hope 
did the basic infantry soldier have? Orientation for foot soldiers in Vietnam was 
sparse at best, though it is interesting to note that the Americal Division was one of 
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the few units in Vietnam to have a brief in-country training program that contained 
some guidance on the local population.
341
 Given the conduct of Americal members 
at My Lai it would appear that this attempt to encourage the creation of a more 
culturally astute force was either ineffective from the onset or rapidly undermined by 
the experiences of soldiers when out in the field of combat. 
 
Without adequate preparation, the clash between American culture and Vietnamese 
society was a shock for virtually all of the Americans sent to serve in Vietnam. 
Soldiers denigrated Vietnamese society, intuitively placing it in a lower state of 
existence than their own. Youthful exuberance combined with supreme confidence 
and physical prowess to produce an innate sense of superiority over a physically 
diminutive population. One soldier recalled the feeling of power that simply being 
amongst the people produced: „You walking through the village and you got your 
great big old flak jacket on. You got your helmet and bandoliers all over you. You 
got your rifle. You tower over most of these people.‟342 This was one part of the 
racialisation of the Vietnamese as a people and of the war as a whole; a process 
which facilitated the gradual lowering, and in some cases removal, of natural barriers 
against atrocity within a human. 
 
Inserting a racial component into war against an Oriental enemy was not new in the 
history of American warfare by the time Vietnam erupted. In three notable twentieth 
century campaigns, the United States military had adopted a racial element to its 
conduct. The counterinsurgency in the Philippines, countering the Japanese in World 
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War II, and fighting on the Korean Peninsula had all been characterised by the 
adoption of a distinctly racial agenda. Paul Kramer, in his lucid and comprehensive 
study on the impact of race on the United States‟ imperial actions in the Philippines, 
argued that racialising the native population during that particular conflict was an 
integral part of U.S. troops‟ „popular culture‟ and was „capable of defining a wartime 
enemy and organizing and motivating violence against it.‟343 In Vietnam a 
remarkably similar process occurred. 
 
Nations at war have frequently adopted caricature as a means of fomenting sustained 
aggression towards their enemies,
344
 but racialisation in the Philippines, the Pacific 
theatre in World War II, and Vietnam was notable for the incorporation of civilians 
into the process. Since civilians were highly visible in these conflicts, American 
soldiers gradually subsumed the entire population – combatant and non-combatant – 
into their prejudicial, racially orientated outlook. It was manifested, and sustained, 
most notably in the adoption of crude racial slurs. This was not unique to Vietnam, 
and in the case of American troops serving there was a progression from the attitudes 
and language of their predecessors who served in the Philippines, Korea and the 
Pacific Theatre. Indeed „gook‟, the most common racial epithet used by soldiers in 
Vietnam, may have originated during the counterinsurgency in the Philippines.
345
 It 
certainly had a link with the Korean War, in which the term „han-guk‟ was the native 
term for a Korean person.
346
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Applying racially charged derogatory labels to enemy soldiers reduced a soldier‟s 
personal, mental opposition to killing a fellow human. It created a distance between 
soldier and opponent, and as Lt. Col. David Hackworth recalled from his time in 
Korea it helped him to justify his actions: „I felt no guilt – few of us did; I‟d been 
trained too well, and besides, the enemy had been utterly dehumanized throughout 
my training. They aren‟t men, they‟re just gooks.‟347 In Vietnam, the enemy were 
just gooks too. „There were gooks on the wire that night‟ recalled one veteran,348 
whilst another talked of „the first gook‟ refusing to talk during one interrogation he 
witnessed.
349
 One officer even tried to explain the linguistic variables of the various 
slurs to Michael Herr, who recalled, 
 
„A bird colonel, commanding a brigade of the 4th Infantry Division: “I‟ll bet 
you always wondered why we call „em Dinks up in this part of the country. I 
thought of it myself. I‟ll tell you, I never did like hearing them called Charlie. 
See, I had an uncle named Charlie, and I liked him too. No, Charlie was just too 
damn good for the little bastards. So I just thought, What are they really like? 
and I came up with rinky-dink. Suits „em just perfect, Rinky-Dink. „Cept that 
was too long, so we cut it down some. And what‟s why we call em Dinks.”‟350 
 
Critically, however, racialisation was not confined to enemy forces. Villagers were 
incorporated into the crude stereotype of a subhuman, animalistic population. James 
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Dabanka, a member of the 9
th
 Infantry in the Mekong Delta, was so disgusted by the 
Vietnamese who all „live like pigs‟ that he confessed „I can‟t see how people can live 
like this.‟351 Paul Kelly regarded the population in a similar vein, and in one letter 
home noted the Vietnamese were „just like animals.‟352 
 
This tendency to regard the Vietnamese as animals helped to facilitate an even more 
destructive dynamic, one which explicitly linked inferiority, pleasure and killing. It 
soon became apparent that a great many American troops in Vietnam regarded the 
combat as akin to hunting, and likened the experience to that enjoyed back home in 
fields and woodland whilst pursuing animal foe. James Simmen, a 1
st
 Lieutenant in 
the 9
th
 Infantry Division, marvelled at „how similar killing is to hunting‟ and that it 
was just like shooting deer.
353
 Another veteran recalled how one combat operation 
became „a turkey shoot‟.354 Shooting and killing therefore became a game to many 
troops; „there was nothing to it‟ recalled one veteran when discussing the emotional 
impact of killing a „gook‟.355 
 
Just as in the overt racialising of the Vietnamese, animalistic descriptions and 
allusions to hunting were by no means unique in the annals of American warfare in 
the Orient. Throughout the brutal fighting against Japanese forces in the Pacific 
during World War II it was common for combat to be simplified to the level of a 
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hunt against a subhuman population.
356
 Thus, American soldiers in Vietnam were 
part of a larger historical trend. The tendency for American troops to employ 
racialisation in their interaction with Oriental peoples was well-established even 
before Vietnam. 
 
Soldiers recalled that racialisation was prevalent throughout much of the Army in 
Vietnam.
357
 The fact that it was not uncommon in previous American military 
interventions perhaps explained why it spread so rapidly throughout the institution in 
that war. It was the casualness of the dehumanisation that made it all the more 
effective at destroying the barriers against inhuman behaviour.  The nonchalant use 
of derogatory, demeaning language in relation to the Vietnamese was self-
perpetuating, and reinforced an attitude of ambivalence, even hate, towards civilians.  
 
In the Philippines, the attitude of American forces had been rooted in the battlefield 
environment, rather than solely through an imported sense of superiority.
358
 So too 
was a great deal of the animosity towards the Vietnamese a result of the way the 
American forces felt they were being treated by the native population. This was not 
merely in the context of their daily contact with the Vietnamese people, but also in 
the way the Viet Cong conducted their war. Americans felt angry at the perceived 
hypocrisy of many civilians, and though some were respectful of their enemy, 
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nevertheless bemoaned the fact that communist forces were not exposing themselves 
to the Army‟s conventional firepower.359 
 
For those troops not engaging uniformed, massed NVA units, the guerrilla nature of 
the warfare was one of the most important factors in facilitating a breakdown in the 
relationship between civilians and soldiers. American forces observed, time and time 
again, a seeming duplicity on the part of the Vietnamese. Villagers would endanger 
U.S troops either through passive unwillingness to notify Americans of danger, or 
through active combat. Supply bases and command posts were often just as unsafe as 
actual combat zones. Frequently the targets of sapper attacks, these bases functioned 
thanks to the labour of Vietnamese civilians in the region, yet these very same 
Vietnamese would often participate in attacks against the posts. Rocket attacks could 
be guided using information from Vietnamese civilians inside the perimeter.
360
  One 
soldier remembered his barber, a man who had been „shaving you with a straight 
razor for the last two months‟, being shot dead in an attack on a compound.361 
Hairdressers, it seemed, were particularly prone to living a double life. David Taylor 
also recalled an enemy sapper killed during an attack against a base as being one of 
the barbers on the post.
362
 Local craftsmen in the Chu Lai area made hand-made, 
booby-trapped cigarette lighters which were then sold at the Post Exchange shop on 
the local base to American troops.
363
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Outside of American bases, on search and destroy operations in the field, civilians 
also posed a lethal danger to U.S. troops. There was an element of unpredictability to 
much of the Vietnamese countryside, and soldiers recalled how wary they were of 
moving through villages when on operations. Ambivalence towards the safety of 
American soldiers angered many of these troops, and the sense of passivity on the 
part of civilians was particularly noticeable in their tendency to avoid notifying 
American troops of local threats. Timothy Vail recalled how „none of us were too 
happy to have a Bouncing Betty (mine) that close to a village. That meant that the 
villagers knew about it and didn‟t say anything.‟364 David Taylor also felt that 
villagers hid information from American troops regarding the placement of mines 
and traps, but as with many of the more professional, pragmatic members of the U.S. 
Army, he had sympathy for civilians who not only had to deal with American forces, 
but also the Viet Cong who would demand loyalty from them.
365
  
 
The reality of the situation, according to Vail, was that „you could look into a hut, a 
hooch, see some people there, they might smile at you, give them a candy bar and 
keep going, and then they might shoot you in the back.‟366 Another soldier, writing 
home in 1968, remarked caustically that „more than once we have captured or killed 
people with weapons whom we recognized as one of those smiling faces we had 
picked up and released earlier.‟ To him and his unit it was „maddening because we 
know damn well that they‟re dinks‟.367 
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For many, „it got to a point where you just didn‟t trust none of them.‟368 For some 
soldiers the only way to deal with this scenario was to adopt a sense of self-
preservation; a behaviour that circumvented any rational limitations on their 
behaviour. One veteran argued, „You can‟t tell who‟s your enemy. You got to shoot 
kids, you got to shoot women. You don‟t want to. You may be sorry you did. But 
you might be sorrier if you didn‟t. That‟s the damn truth.‟369 Without trust, there 
could be no empathy in the relationship between American troops and Vietnamese 
civilians. Without any empathy, the emotional response on the part of American 
soldiers interacting with the Vietnamese was often based around anger and fear. 
Antoine Roy, after one incident in which a trap was found near a self-declared 
friendly village, recalled „turning around and looking at that sign back there and 
saying, you bastards.‟370 Another soldier, writing home at the time of his deployment 
with the Americal Division, „felt like turning my machine guns on the village to kill 
every man, woman and child in it‟ after these civilians had sold drinks to soldiers at 
one point, and had then informed the VC on American movements moments later.
371
 
Soldiers struggled to comprehend the fact that civilians were often forced into 
dangerous roles as assistants for the enemy, perhaps an indication of the unsuitability 
of applying the military‟s unyielding sense of loyalty to civilians seeking to remain 
alive in bitterly contested areas .
372
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The response to losing a comrade when on patrol in these villages was often one of 
the most important in determining soldiers‟ actions against civilians. In cases of 
brutal attacks on civilians, a common factor was grief and anger at losing a fellow 
soldier. The notion of „brothers-in-arms‟ was never more true than in Vietnam, 
where the isolated, unpredictable nature of combat made units emotionally close. 
The only way to survive was to depend on your fellow soldiers, and a huge 
interdependence was created between troops.
373
 Members of the same unit were „like 
brothers‟, and the loss of even one was an emotional impact that hurt men deeply.374 
Taylor put it mildly when he stated that soldiers „were chagrined‟ about men being 
lost, or injured by traps and mines, yet there was no enemy to fight back against.
375
 
 
Thus, the emotional response to losing a friend and comrade was directed against 
those that were the most visible representatives of an unseen enemy. Since civilians, 
as we have seen, had already been subsumed with genuine enemy combatants 
through crude, aesthetic racialising, they were the most likely to be on the receiving 
end of a soldier‟s anger. Russ Palm, after losing a friend to hostile fire, „dumped 
sixty rounds in a man that was a thousand yards away. I lost it big time.‟376 In the 
case of My Lai, the loss of Sergeant George Cox, who was a popular member of the 
11
th
 Brigade, created a surge of anger towards local villagers who had failed to tell 
troops of mines in the region. The unit attended Cox‟s memorial on the day of their 
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pre-operational briefing.
377
 The actions of soldiers at My Lai a short time later 
reflected a pent up desire to offer recrimination for the loss of Cox. 
 
Such a reaction was not necessarily entirely independent of the American military as 
an institution. Dr. Jonathan Shay, in his fascinating comparative discussion of the 
Iliad and the Vietnam War, noted that several veterans he had worked with in his 
research into combat grief recalled their superiors exhorting them, „don‟t get sad. Get 
even!‟378 At My Lai, officers demonstrated a similar willingness to harness 
emotional impulses as a combat determinant. Though arguments continue to rage 
over the exact nature of the pre-My Lai briefing, there is little contention that senior 
officers made an impression on their men in urging them to pick up their aggression 
and to revenge themselves on targets in the village.
379
 
 
Getting even, however, was not necessarily about killing civilians out of hand. The 
fact that civilians were regarded as expendable was in large part down to the 
acceptability and prevalence of petty, niggling examples of disregard for Vietnamese 
life and culture. A soldier sank a Vietnamese sampan boat with a rock, just for 
fun.
380
 Another soldier simply made a bet that he would run down an old Vietnamese 
woman on the road, and in doing so, broke her hip.
381
 This behaviour was accepted 
as normal in an environment in which the Vietnamese were regarded as racially, 
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materially and culturally inferior. These actions, unpunished in the anonymity of 
Vietnam, had a powerful impact on the behaviour of young American soldiers. They 
saw that they could get away with small examples of naked aggression towards the 
Vietnamese. At such a youthful age, „one of the most malleable and vulnerable 
stages of their lives‟,382 these boys were given the chance to act without any real 
oversight. Their youth made them highly susceptible to the bad habits, and the poor 
behaviour, that developed in Vietnam. For Grossman, it amounted to „a real-world 
enactment of The Lord of the Flies with guns, and (was) destined to internalise the 
horrors of combat during one of the most vulnerable and susceptible stages of 
life.‟383 
 
The horrors of war were not only linked to the loss of comrades. Interacting with 
civilians forced many American soldiers to make decisions which in normal society 
were unimaginable. One veteran despaired that „they trained me to kill. They sent me 
to Vietnam. They didn‟t tell me that I‟d be fighting kids.‟384 Soldiers had to come to 
terms with the fact that the enemy they were fighting was not simply made up of 
fighting-age males, attired in distinctive combat uniforms, and placed in traditional 
military formations and fighting positions. Child combatants were a part of life in 
Vietnam. Sapper attacks on U.S. firebases and base camps often involved the use of 
children as a sacrificial element of the assault – taken from local villages and 
deployed as a way of using up American defensive fire.
385
 Even when out in the 
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villages, patrolling rather than engaging enemy forces, children were a hazard. Bill 
Paris recalled that only strong leadership and personal decisiveness avoided tragedy 
when a child threw a grenade at troops moving through a village. For Paris, the 
moment was the 
 
„defining line between how you‟re going handle something and it can go either 
way. Then the captain started hollering, “Don‟t shoot.” You know. “Don‟t 
shoot, don‟t shoot, don‟t shoot.” This little kid is standing there he is probably 
nine years old, eight years old, just looking at us because you know somebody 
gave him this and said, “Here go throw it at the Americans and do this.” He 
didn‟t really know. If he did, so what? He was still a young kid.‟386 
 
Incidents like this cast serious doubt in the minds of American soldiers. It summed 
up the horror of Vietnam, and many American soldiers often struggled to adequately 
cope and perform professionally as a result. Gary Noller, who served in the Americal 
Division after being drafted in 1969, was eloquent in his summation of just how 
these agencies could determine the likelihood of atrocity in Vietnam. Soldiers, he 
thought, „had their low points. How they coped with low points could vary and I 
think in fact a lot of times the way people coped with their low points is they took it 
out on the enemy or they took it out on civilians.‟387 
 
A decade later, in El Salvador, Woerner declared that he „was unable to come to a 
personal evaluation of the degree of support the military enjoys from the civilian 
populous. However, having heard so often the Armed Forces‟ thesis of its good 
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relations, I am tempted to give it some credibility.‟388 Reflecting the naive approach 
to the conflict that characterised much of the United States‟ policy in El Salvador, 
Woerner completely misunderstood the interaction between civilians and ESAF. 
Perhaps the General believed the civil nature of the war, and the socio-economic 
composition of ESAF, meant soldiers fighting avowedly leftist guerrillas would 
naturally have the support of the civilian portion of society. Enlisted soldiers in 
ESAF were often simply picked up off the streets of their communities, and as such 
came from the same social and economic circles as their victims.
389
 Neither the tiny 
wealthy minority, nor the small middle-class, sent their own sons to war as 
soldiers.
390
 Even the junior officers had little reason to regard themselves as being 
substantially better than the campesinos and villagers they led operations against – 
they had more in common with these members of Salvadoran society than the 
oligarchs who, as Bosch stated, rarely opened the doors of their elite country clubs to 
even the most „European‟-featured officers.391 Woerner might have dismissed 
civilian-ESAF friction because of this apparent lack of socio-economic friction 
between soldiers and civilians. 
 
In reality, however, there was a turbulent relationship between civilians and ESAF. It 
was largely based upon a similar sense of superiority within the military that had 
been common in Vietnam. Historical and cultural dynamics had forged a Salvadoran 
military that believed in its own self-importance and sense of supremacy. For 
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decades, even centuries, a clear distinction between soldiers and civilians had been 
nurtured in the country. Ever since the Spanish monarchs‟ decision to implement the 
policy of fuero militar during the era of the conquistadores, the military of El 
Salvador – and those of other Latin American nations – had regarded themselves as a 
separate class to the civilians of the country.
392
 By the time the Matanza occurred in 
1932, the Salvadoran military was already imbued with a distinct sense of class 
superiority. The Matanza served only to heighten such an attitude, reinforcing the 
traditional dichotomy between the campesino labouring class of society and the 
military. Anderson is of little doubt that the peasant revolt and subsequent 
government repression were absolutely fundamental in escalating the tensions 
between poor and wealthy in El Salvador. With the military maintaining silence over 
the matter throughout the twentieth century, myth and legend had developed until 
there was a sense amongst the conservative element of the country that a heroic army 
had held back the crashing waves of the murderous Indian rebels who had allied 
themselves with the cause of International Communism.
393
   
 
The Matanza’s impact on the way in which the military and conservatives viewed 
the poor of the country should not be underestimated. Anderson regards the events of 
January 1932 as changing the entire nature of El Salvador as a country. In his view, 
„the age of ideologies had come to Latin America.‟394 By introducing the destructive 
rhetoric of strident anti-communism to the existing class-based dynamic in the 
country, the Matanza had further polarised the relationship between civilians and 
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armed forces. Even more so now, soldiers regarded civilians with contempt and 
hatred, particularly the campesino sector of society. There was an „almost paranoiac‟ 
fear of leftists and communists following the Matanza, fuelled greatly by the 
hysterical yet persistent belief that the rebellious Indians had butchered hundreds of 
bourgeoisie.
395
 
 
This paranoia continued throughout the twentieth century, but was made 
geopolitically acceptable by the international fight against communism that 
developed in the aftermath of World War II, and escalated during the Cold War. No 
longer was the repression of campesinos and leftist reformists in general to be 
regarded solely through a Salvadoran prism. Instead, a succession of American 
administrations in the post-war period placed the policy of anti-communism at the 
forefront of United States foreign policy, and tied El Salvador into this process. 
 
The result of such importance being placed on anti-communism was an isolation and 
ostracism of those in El Salvador who did not conform to the status quo espoused by 
the authoritarian, repressive but crucially non-communist, military government. 
When the civil war erupted, and Reagan entered the White House, it was made clear 
that the defeat of communism was the primary motivation for U.S. activity in the 
country.
396
 Conservative elements of Salvadoran society had the materiel, and now 
the full ideological support, of the United States. Political heavyweights, 
emboldened by the support of Reagan and his conservative brethren, ramped up the 
incendiary oratory and spurred on the military. Roberto D‟Aubuisson, after taking up 
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the mantle of „respectable‟ politician, vowed to „exterminate‟ opposition, and 
represented a party whose members were willing to sanction, amongst other things, 
the use of napalm and the slaughter of civilians as a tolerable, legitimate means of 
winning the war.
397
 
 
Consequently, when the simmering insurgency flourished in 1980 and civil war 
broke out, an „ideological overcharge‟ had already been constructed within El 
Salvador.
398
 Those who had been a thorn in the side of the military and its oligarchic 
masters during the twentieth-century, and even before this period, were now 
subjected to this „overcharge‟. Not only were they regarded as a threat to the status 
quo based on historical precedent, but they were now a dangerous element within the 
context of world-wide anti-communism. Those who resisted the non-communist 
system were not viewed as legitimate opposition, but as „terrorists‟ and 
„subversives‟. When civil war erupted, ESAF members refused to define their enemy 
as legitimate combatants. Instead, they were terrorists, intent only on subverting the 
economy and destroying the wealth of the country.
399
 An indication of just how 
prevalent the categorisation was, and just how polarised the nation as a whole was, is 
clear in the fact that even American advisors found themselves identifying potential 
guerrilla adversaries as „terrorists‟.400 
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The ubiquity of this categorisation extended to the non-combatant portion of 
Salvadoran society too. The term masas, denoting those civilians who support 
guerrilla units, was applied in a blanket manner to entire areas of El Salvador that 
had a notable guerrilla presence. Since terrorists were legitimate targets, so too were 
supporters of terrorism. At El Mozote, soldiers were heard to remark to their victims 
that „all you sons of bitches are collaborators‟ and that „you‟re going to have to pay 
for those bastards.‟401 In July 1984, the area surrounding the village of Los Llanitos 
was targeted by an Army sweep. Utilising elements of the Atlacatl Battalion, the 
First Infantry Brigade, and the Fifth Military Detachment, the Army killed 68 
civilians in an apparent reprisal assault for the area‟s support of guerrilla forces, and 
its role as a staging area for a recent rebel assault on the Cerrón Grande dam. Major 
Ricardo Murcia, the Atlacatl‟s executive officer, told journalists that „no peaceful 
life‟ existed in the area, which was made up of a population comprising only 
„terrorists.‟402 
 
Civilians in the border regions of El Salvador suffered greatly from this tendency to 
link guerrilla attacks with civilian support. Colonel Carlos Reynaldo López Nuila, 
the Vice Minister of Public Security, stated bluntly that refugee camps were guerrilla 
sanctuaries, but that owing to an arrangement with Honduras, El Salvador‟s military 
was able „to go into these areas and clean them up.‟403 A belief that refugees were 
part of the insurgency may explain the violence of the Sumpul and Lempa rivers, 
when ESAF engaged large groups of displaced civilians attempting to flee into 
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Honduras. If so, this was a similar sentiment to that expressed by American forces 
during the Philippine insurrection, in which the stubborn presence of guerrilla forces 
was put down to the entire population‟s complicity in the insurrection.404 The 
sustained ability of FMLN units to conduct operations in particular areas of El 
Salvador was, like the Philippines and Vietnam, put down to civilian culpability. 
 
Like Vietnam, soldiers‟ suspicions of entire communities increased their willingness 
to target civilians. Children and women paid a heavy price for this sentiment, as 
soldiers regarded them as being inherently dangerous. At El Mozote, children and 
women were slaughtered alongside their male family members and neighbours. One 
member of the Atlacatl Battalion was overheard justifying this because if they didn‟t 
„kill them (children) now, they‟ll just grow up to be guerrillas. We have to take care 
of the job now.‟405 Those who didn‟t kill out of a sense of future self-preservation 
were overheard to remark that the children were guerrillas at that moment, and 
killing them was justice.
406
 
 
Women were also targeted by ESAF soldiers. It may have been that the presence of 
women in FMLN units provided soldiers with a greater plausibility in employing 
violence against the female section of civilian society. It has been estimated that in 
the 1970s and 1980s one third of all of the FMLN‟s guerrillas were women.407 It 
could be that the rape and murder of women at El Mozote was seen by the 
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perpetrators as a reprisal for the willingness of others of the same sex to serve in the 
guerrilla forces. More likely, however, is the fact that the horrific violence directed at 
women and young girls in particular was a result of the simple fact that an all-male 
combat force was placed into an environment in which females were defenceless. 
Soldiers, without any regular outlet for their pent-up sexual desires, had ample 
opportunity to take what they wanted by force in the field of combat. Strong 
leadership was vital in deterring this behaviour, but all too often it was lacking. 
David Taylor believed his willingness „to just keep an eye on my men‟ helped stave 
off any improper behaviour from his unit.
408
 Without leaders of Taylor‟s calibre, 
units could behave atrociously with women and girls they found on operations. One 
Vietnam veteran remembered his unit as being „like an animal pack‟ when they 
raped and killed one particular young girl during a sweep operation.
409
 At El Mozote, 
soldiers were heard to remark on the enjoyment they derived from raping the women 
and children in the village.
410
 However, it is noticeable that incidents of rape tended 
to involve groups of soldiers, suggesting that peer pressure and the subsequent desire 
to conform was a powerful motivating factor. Indeed, studies of violence have 
increasingly concentrated on the notion of societal pressure over innate „evilness‟. 
Grossman argues persuasively that the close bond between soldiers can limit their 
willingness to oppose group actions.
411
 Just as this emotional bond fostered an 
aggressive outpouring of anger upon a comrade‟s death, so too did it provoke 
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toleration for, and indeed willingness of, atrocious action in individuals when 
partaking as part of a larger group. 
 
A sense of conformity and personal desires, based frequently around a thirst for self-
gratification and self-gain, created an environment in which revenge was sometimes 
a source of violence employed against civilians. In one example, which occurred in 
July 1981 following an altercation with a football team at an Army checkpoint, at 
least 19 people were taken from their homes in the community of Armenia and 
murdered by troops conducting a door-to-door search operation. Shortly afterwards, 
the football team was deleted from the local league‟s register.412  
 
One Vietnam veteran later admitted that „too many of us forgot that Vietnamese 
were people. We didn‟t treat them like people after a while.‟413 The murder of 
Vietnamese and Salvadoran civilians was the ultimate expression of this belief. In 
denying the humanity of civilians, soldiers moved through the final barrier against 
atrocity. Parallels between the two conflicts abound when examining how soldiers 
viewed civilians. Each war was marred by historical and cultural processes which 
had a deep influence on soldiers. Whilst a racialisation of the Vietnamese provided a 
justification for the actions of American soldiers, in El Salvador it was the historical 
schism between the elite armed forces and the poor working class campesino 
population which fostered toleration for brutality. Civilians in both wars were 
regarded with deep suspicion. Soldiers felt civilians were hypocritical or had direct 
links with the enemy. Without effective judicial deterrence, professional leadership 
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and a more productive form of military strategy, soldiers turned suspicion into 
hatred, and hatred into murder. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
„Warfare prosecuted according to recognized laws of war has been the exception not 
the rule.‟414 - George Kassimeris. 
 
In the opening months of 1982, officials in the Reagan administration steadfastly 
denied an atrocity had occurred at El Mozote during the previous December. Thomas 
Enders, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, testified to 
Congress that reports of the incident were exaggerated, and that there was no 
evidence to suggest the Salvadoran armed forces had committed systematic 
murder.
415
 Ronald Reagan‟s administration had vowed to „draw the line‟ in El 
Salvador against global communist aggression.
416
 Drawing the line cost thousands of 
innocent lives.
417
 In 1994, Mark Danner published The Massacre at El Mozote. The 
work described the events of December 1981 in El Mozote, narrating how in this one 
incident alone, members of ESAF killed 767 men, women and children during an 
anti-guerrilla sweep in the region.  
 
A decade earlier the United States had evacuated its last combat forces from 
Vietnam. In 1954 President Dwight Eisenhower had demanded action to halt 
communist expansion in South East Asia, memorably comparing the situation to 
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falling dominoes.
418
 The United States proved unable to prop up the Vietnamese 
domino, and it fell in 1975. The war that had raged in Vietnam cost, according to 
some estimates, the lives of two million civilians.
419
 Nearly five hundred of these 
deaths occurred in the small community of My Lai when, on 16 March 1968, 
soldiers from the U.S. Army swept through the area. Incidents of civilian deaths by 
U.S. forces weren‟t limited to the My Lai tragedy, and post-war investigations into 
war crimes revealed more occurred during Vietnam than had previously been 
thought.
420
 
 
The actions of soldiers during Vietnam and El Salvador‟s civil war demonstrated that 
Kassimeris‟ sad indictment of modern warfare was particularly apt for these 
conflicts. War, as Guenter Lewy argued, can bring out the best in men; it can, as he 
added, also lead to the worst of human nature.
421
 In Vietnam and El Salvador, at My 
Lai and at El Mozote, soldiers participated in behaviour that demonstrated the worst 
of human nature. Their brutality defies simplistic evaluation. It is unacceptable to 
dismiss them as simply „evil‟. Instead, understanding such violence requires the 
deeper contextualisation that Aldo Lauria-Santiago demanded.
422
 It has been the 
intention of this study to provide such an understanding. 
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The soldiers who murdered civilians in Vietnam and El Salvador were a product of a 
path to atrocity; a path that shaped their behaviour from the moment they entered the 
military to the moment they descended into brutality. Their training was the initial 
stage along this path. During their instruction in the ways of the military, soldiers 
experienced a world that taught them an aptitude for killing. They were educated in 
the weapons and tactics required to defeat conventional enemy units. Firepower was 
stressed as the solution to the insurgencies in Vietnam and El Salvador. Training 
demanded conformity to this ethos.
423
 Instructors diminished independence of 
thought in favour of extolling the effectiveness of quick reaction.
424
 Human rights 
instruction was insufficient to curb this emphasis on convention. In both conflicts, 
soldiers were ineffectively taught about the rules of warfare. 
 
Once thrust onto the field of combat in Vietnam and El Salvador, soldiers found 
themselves applying their training to a situation entirely unsuited to convention. 
Operations relegated the safety of the civilian population to a secondary objective 
behind the destruction of enemy combatants. Counterinsurgency programs like the 
Marine Corps‟ CAP system were rejected. Weapons systems that were unsuitable for 
counterinsurgency were employed as part of the conventional drive by the U.S. 
Army and ESAF. Statistics and ratios removed the human interaction required for 
counterinsurgency. 
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Command deficiencies were crucial in fostering an environment in which soldiers 
could commit atrocity. There was good leadership, particularly in Vietnam.
425
 
However, such leaders were the exception, and the U.S. forces there suffered from a 
very poor command element.
426
 Those who committed atrocities suffered under such 
unprofessional leadership. Specific officers allowed indiscipline and brutal 
behaviour to occur.
427
 In El Salvador, strong, sustained links – ideological and fiscal 
– between conservatives and the officer corps corrupted the professionalism of the 
military and resulted in the shocking ability of hard-line oligarchs to influence the 
direction and targets of military campaigns. 
 
The final stage in the path to atrocity was the ultimate breakdown in the relationship 
between soldiers and the population they were sent to defend. In Vietnam and El 
Salvador, the relationship between the two was marked by mistrust, anger and 
hatred. In interacting with civilians, soldiers were influenced by processes both large 
and small. Individual and group experiences contributed enormously to a soldier‟s 
ability to identify, and empathise, with civilians. Tragic incidents, like the loss of a 
comrade, provoked emotional responses in troops that were directed at civilians. On 
a larger scale, racial and geo-political processes put immense pressure on soldiers to 
conform to accepted notions of behaviour with civilians. Racialisation proved a 
destructive agency in Vietnam, just as it had in the Philippines, Korea and the Pacific 
Theatre in World War II. In El Salvador, anti-communism of the most rabid form 
was compounded by the long history of social and economic subjugation of the rural 
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and poor sector of Salvadoran society. Soldiers tied their own terrible personal 
experiences into this wider narrative of intolerance, and civilians paid the price. 
 
This path to atrocity in Vietnam and El Salvador was not isolated from the larger 
trends of history that occurred in the period. Rather, examining war crimes and their 
perpetrators during these two conflicts shows how the limitations of American 
military doctrine and foreign policy strategy were evident in Vietnam, El Salvador, 
and the intervening period.  This study has shown that the fundamental weakness in 
U.S. policy during this period was a dependence on a conventional approach to 
defeating insurgencies. Counterinsurgency demands a political solution.
428
 In 
Vietnam and El Salvador, regular military force was applied. The effect of such an 
unsuitable policy was to diminish the importance of the population, relegating 
human rights to a secondary concern behind the destruction of guerrilla units. In 
Vietnam, American units failed to learn from experiences in fighting insurgencies. 
Despite having experience of guerrilla combat in the French and Indian Wars in the 
18
th
 Century, the War of Independence, the Civil War and the Philippines conflict, 
the U.S. military failed to apply such experience in Vietnam.
429
 Pacification 
programs occurred too late and without sufficient emphasis.
430
 
 
In the aftermath of Vietnam, the U.S. military maintained a reliance on 
conventionality. Marginalising important studies into the failures of Vietnam, the 
military took to heart those analyses that affirmed its conventional doctrine was the 
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correct one. Generals William E. DePuy and Donn A. Starry applied the lessons of 
the 1973 Yom Kippur War in order to justify their decision to diminish the 
importance of counterinsurgency and emphasise conventional weapons and 
strategies.
431
 Colonel Harry Summers argued in his 1982 work, On Strategy, that the 
U.S. would have won in Vietnam had American forces been allowed by their 
political masters to invade North Vietnam in the aftermath of the Battle of Ia Drang 
in 1965.
432
 The book was widely read in the military and received great support.
433
 
Thus, when the U.S. military came to increase its support of the Salvadoran armed 
forces in the latter stages of the 1970s, it did so from an unsuitable doctrinal position. 
This belief that conventionality could defeat insurgencies filtered into ESAF, and 
affirmed their own propensity to use indiscriminate, massed firepower to counter its 
foes. American weapons systems and training programs continuously reinforced this 
devotion to regular warfare from ESAF. Nagl argued that conventional forces focus 
on „kinetic‟ offensive actions instead of supporting the political, economic and social 
reforms necessary for counterinsurgency.
434
 The inability of the U.S. to recognise 
this failing of conventional force increased the propensity for atrocity in Vietnam 
and El Salvador. 
 
However, this study has also shown that accusations of direct American complicity 
for atrocities in El Salvador are often overstated. Central America held a great 
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interest for the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s.
435
 El Salvador was particularly 
important, and the actions of the Carter and Reagan administrations demonstrated a 
commitment to defeating the leftist insurgency there. However, their actions were 
diluted in impact because of two important reasons. Firstly, U.S. programs suffered 
from a fragmented command structure and often irreconcilable goals. American 
observers complained of a lack of unity in command in the country.
436
 General 
Wallace Nutting, commanding officer SouthCom, complained of a „total lack of 
coherence‟ from Washington.437 This was compounded by differences in objectives. 
The embassy and military often bickered over the nature and extent of U.S. 
assistance, and it weakened the ability of the U.S. to influence El Salvador‟s armed 
forces.
438
 ESAF needed a great deal of influence, given the direction it was taking in 
trying to defeat the insurgency. Moulded by a history of brutal repression, supported 
by wealthy oligarchs with a stake in maintaining the status quo, and commanded by 
a clique of nepotistic, conservative officers whose only loyalty was to the institution 
itself, ESAF stubbornly resisted American influence. Indeed, El Salvador‟s was 
probably the most successful military in Central America in resisting U.S. 
influence.
439
 It was less successful in prosecuting the war against the FMLN and 
protecting Salvadorans from its own forces. 
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The inability to protect civilians, be they Vietnamese or Salvadoran, was a hallmark 
of those two conflicts. There were soldiers who believed in honour and courage; men 
like Timothy Vail who believed that „to be able to look at my face in the mirror 
when I got home‟ was far more important than a desire to please the Army.440 The 
perpetrators of war crimes in Vietnam and El Salvador were not as strong, and were 
unable to resist the conditioning which had occurred throughout their career in the 
military. During their training, in the field of combat, under the supervision of their 
leaders, and in their interaction with civilians, soldiers were put under great pressure 
to ignore counterinsurgency policies and concentrate on a type of warfare that 
diminished the humanity of the population. Colman McCarthy saw in El Salvador 
that the people had been made the enemy.
441
 When this occurred, the path to atrocity 
was complete. 
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Glossary 
 
 
AIASA Annual Integrated Assessment of 
Security Assistance for El Salvador 
 
ANSESAL Salvadoran National Special Services 
Agency 
 
ARENA National Republican Alliance 
 
BIRI Rapid Reaction Battalion 
 
CAP Combined Action Platoon 
 
CIA     Central Intelligence Agency 
 
COMUSMACV Commander, United States Military 
Assistance Command Vietnam 
     Central Intelligence Agency 
 
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 
 
ESAF El Salvador‟s Armed Forces 
 
FMLN Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front 
 
FMS Foreign Military Sales 
 
IMET International Military Education and 
Training 
 
JAG Judge Advocates General 
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LIC Low Intensity Conflict 
 
MACV Military Assistance Command Vietnam 
 
MAP Military Assistance Program 
 
MilGroup United States Military Group 
 
MTT Military Training Team 
 
NCO Non Commissioned Officer 
 
NVA North Vietnamese Army 
 
ORDEN Democratic Nationalist Organisation 
 
SouthCom United States Southern Command 
 
USASOA United States Army School of the 
Americas 
 
VC Viet Cong 
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